RECOGNITION PRINCIPLE

Different Principles in Recognizing States


A. Tobar or Wilson Principle
Examples
1. The Baltic States
2. Croatia and Slovenia Unrecognized

B. Stimpson Doctrine
Historical Basis

C. Estrada Doctrine
Example
Ukraine's Independence


A. Tobar or Wilson Principle

Under this principle, it is suggested that recognition shall not be extended to any government established by revolution, civil war, coup d’etat or other forms of internal violence until the freely elected representatives of the people have organized a constitutional government.

Examples.

1. The Baltic States

Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were recognized as independent states in the early 1920's. The United States, announced its de jure recognition on 28 July 1922 after noting `the successful maintenance within their borders of political and economic stability' by the governments of the three Baltic states.

2. Croatia and Slovenia Unrecognized

On 25 June 1991, both Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. The Constitutional Resolution Regarding the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia adopted by the Croatian Parliament based its actions `upon the will of the nation demonstrated at the referendum of 19 May 1991,' and argued that `the SFRY no longer is acting as the constitutional-legal organized state.' Article I of the Resolution proclaims Croatia as a sovereign and independent state. Interestingly, however, Article II states that Croatia thus `begins the process of disassociation from the other republics of the SFRY' and `begins the process of gaining international recognition.'


B. Stimpson Doctrine

It was “ incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.”

Historical Basis:

The policy of expansionism in China pursued by the autonomous Kwantung Army of Japan accelerated in the late 1920s and early 1930s and became a major concern of the U.S. government. On September 18, 1931, Japanese soldiers guarding the South Manchurian Railway blew up part of the track in order to manufacture an excuse to seize Manchuria proper. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson reacted to what he regarded as a violation of international law as well as treaties that the Japanese Government had signed. Since calls for a cessation of hostilities between China and Japan failed and President Herbert Hoover had rejected economic sanctions in principle, Stimson declared in January 1932 that the U.S. Government would not recognize any territorial or administrative changes the Japanese might impose upon China. The Stimson Doctrine was echoed in March 1932 by the Assembly of the League of Nations, which unanimously adopted an anti-Japanese resolution incorporating virtually verbatim the Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition. However, as the Secretary of State later realized, he had at his disposal only "spears of straws and swords of ice." In short order, Japanese representatives simply walked out of the League, and the Kwangtung Army formalized its conquest of Manchuria by establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo under former Chinese emperor Pu-Yi. When war between Japan and China broke out following a minor clash between military units at the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937, the impotence of the "Stimson Doctrine" became even more apparent.

C. Estrada Doctrine

Under this doctrine, it is declared that it would, as it saw fit, continue or terminate its relations with any country in which a political upheaval had taken place “ and in so doing it does not pronounce judgment, regarding the right of foreign nations to accept, maintain or replace their governments or authorities.

Example:

Ukraine's Independence

Like other Soviet republics, Ukraine had declared its sovereignty on 16 July 1990. Many observers saw this declaration, and that of Byelorussia of 27 July 1990, in terms of jockeying for economic advantage in the process of the devolution of power from the centre. On 24 August 1991, after the collapse of the Moscow coup, Ukraine went one step further by declaring its independence and Byelorussia followed suit the next day. Ukraine's Declaration of Independence was, however, made subject to the results of a referendum to be held on 1 December 1991 and countries accordingly had good reason to hold off consideration of recognition until that time.
To the surprise of most observers who had underestimated the support for independence in Ukraine, participation in the referendum was over 80% and the vote in favour exceeded 90%. The referendum result effectively completed the Declaration of Independence and other countries had no further excuse to hold off consideration of recognition. But there was one strong political factor militating against early recognition. President Gorbachev was working towards a Union Treaty which would preserve a Soviet centre and countries were loathe to undercut the stability that such a move seemed to represent, particularly in terms of continuing Soviet acceptance of its obligations under the various disarmament treaties.Canada, home to a large community tracing its origins to Ukraine, decided not to wait for Gorbachev's Union Treaty. On 2 December 1991, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that Canada had decided to recognize Ukraine as an independent state. The Canadian statement referred to the overwhelming support for independence in the referendum and undertook to enter into negotiations on diplomatic relations noting that `as part of these negotiations, Canada will wish to be satisfied with respect to Ukraine's stated intentions that it will ensure that nuclear weapons remain under secure control until they are disposed of, comply with existing arms control, disarmament and other international agreements, and adhere to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and other CSCE documents, with particular attention to full respect for human rights and protection of minorities.