Russia-Georgia Conflict Has Deep Roots
by Corey Flintoff
The conflict between Russia and Georgia goes well beyond the separatist enclave of South Ossetia. It's also a reassertion of Russian power along its borders. Here's some background on the immediate issues that triggered the latest round of fighting.
What are the separatist issues bedeviling Georgia?
There are two ethnic groups that claim portions of what is now the Republic of Georgia, the Ossetians and the Abkhazians. Like the Georgians, both groups hail from the Caucasus Mountains at the eastern end of the Black Sea. When the Soviets annexed Georgia after the Russian Revolution, they created autonomous regions in Georgia for each of these groups, and those are the regions that are in dispute today.
As the Soviet Union began to break up in the late 1980s, separatists in both regions resisted becoming part of Georgia, preferring to throw their lot in with Russia.
The two ethnic regions — South Ossetia in eastern Georgia, and Abkhazia, on its western Black Sea coast — have been essentially independent since the last round of fighting in 2004. They've had Russian financial support and military backing in the form of Russian troops who were part of a regional peacekeeping mission. Russia has issued passports to most Abkhazians and Ossetians, so it can say that it is intervening on behalf of its own citizens.
Why is Russia supporting the separatists?
Russian nationalists have chafed at the loss of their Soviet-era buffer zone of republics and former Eastern bloc allies. Georgia has been a particular irritant, especially after the Rose Revolution brought pro-Western President Mikhail Saakashvili to power in 2004. Moscow has strongly opposed Georgia's efforts to become part of NATO, seeing the alliance as a potentially unfriendly military presence on Russia's border. Georgia could become the eastern anchor of a chain of NATO allies that stretches from Poland to Turkey.
Georgia is already a military ally of the United States in Iraq, where Georgia deployed about 2,000 troops. The U.S. airlifted those troops back to Georgia because of the crisis there.
Saakashvili took note of the fact that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin personally oversaw the Russian military operation from a command post in Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia. Saakashvili said the Russian leader's purpose is "to depose the democratically elected government of Georgia."
Why are the two regions so important to Georgia?
Although it's comparatively small — only about 50 miles across — South Ossetia represents a deep bite into Georgian territory. It extends south toward two of Georgia's most important assets, pipelines that carry oil and gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to Turkey. Russia opposed the building of those pipelines, which cut Russia out of some of the action in the oil-rich former republics.
Georgia has claimed for years that South Ossetia has become a haven for organized crime, especially the smuggling of tax-free goods from Russia. Georgia has plenty of its own problems with corruption and has been unable to control smuggling elsewhere along the border.
What about Abkhazia?
Abkhazia is important because it includes more than half of Georgia's shoreline on the Black Sea, including ports and some prime tourist areas. Its western edge touches Russia's Black Sea coast, near Sochi, the resort town where Putin has his summer residence.
Abkhazia had a sizable population of ethnic Georgians who were forcibly expelled from the region during the fighting in the early 1990s. Human Rights Watch reported that the Abkhaz separatists committed widespread atrocities against Georgians, including massacres, rapes, torture and ethnic cleansing. The findings were corroborated in a 1994 country report from the U.S. State Department.
There are still pockets of ethnic Georgians living in South Ossetia, and Georgia asserts that it must protect them from the same fate.
What triggered the current fighting?
It began as a series of sniper-fire incidents and clashes between the South Ossetian militia and Georgian army troops during the first week in August. By Aug. 7, Georgian President Saakashvili was charging that the South Ossetians were using heavy weapons that had been brought into the area in violation of the cease-fire. Civilians began to flee Tskhinvali, the town that serves as South Ossetia's capital. On Aug. 8, Saakashvili ordered Georgian troops to capture the city.
Russia responded with airstrikes on Georgian positions, not just in South Ossetia but also in Abkhazia, where Georgian troops still had a foothold in the Kodori Gorge region. Russia has said it is only seeking to restore stability to the two regions, but as its troops advanced out of the separatist regions into undisputed Georgian territory, President Bush accused Russia of seeking to crush the Georgian military and trigger the overthrow of Saakashvili's government.
What can the United States do?
President Bush has called on Russia to stop what he said was a "dramatic and brutal escalation" of violence, and he urged Russia to agree to a cease-fire offer by Georgia. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice joined in a conference call with foreign ministers from Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan — the G-7 group of leading industrial nations. The group, which often includes Russia as an eighth member, called on Russia to respect Georgia's borders and accept the cease-fire.
The U.S. is also backing mediation efforts by the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Russia's Policy Towards Ethnic Conflict in Independent Georgia
By James Graham
Russia's policy towards ethnic conflict in Georgia has reflected the fluid and conflicting nature of Russian domestic politics. During the early 1990s Russia's Defence Ministry helped create an unstable and weak Georgia while Russia's Foreign Ministry pushed the need for a strong independent and friendly Georgia as a bulwark against Islamist expansion. Under Putin Russia has linked Georgia to its Chechnya conflict and the war on terrorism. The result has been a weak and fragmented Georgia that has survived in dismembered state. This has satisfied most of Russia's desires but broken and humiliated, Georgia presents a long-term problem for Russia largely of its own making.
Georgia's strategic position has ensured it is of vital military and economic significance to Russia. Its border with NATO member Turkey has always made Georgia strategically important and warranting the locating of numerous Soviet military bases within its territory. Georgia's opposite border is with the unstable North Caucasus region of Russia including the breakaway province of Chechnya. Georgian territory also contains vital Black Sea ports and sits astride potential routes for Russian controlled oil and gas pipelines. Additionally communications and pipelines linking Russia and pro-Russian Armenia run exclusively through Georgia. Russia's policy towards ethnic conflict in Georgia had to take account of numerous geo-strategic factors.
Complete text of this article can be seen in the site:
http://www.historyorb.com/russia/georgia.shtml
Russia-Georgia conflict
by Staff
Georgia and Russia Nearing All-Out War
Michael Schwirtz, Anne Barnard, C. J. Chivers and Anne Barnard., New York TimesThe conflict between Russia and the former Soviet republic of Georgia moved toward all-out war on Saturday as Russia prepared to land ground troops on Georgia’s coast and broadened its bombing campaign both within Georgia and in the disputed territory of Abkhazia.
The fighting that began when Georgian forces tried to retake the capital of South Ossetia, a pro-Russian region that won de facto autonomy from Georgia in the early 1990s, appeared to be developing into the worst clashes between Russia and a foreign military since the 1980s war in Afghanistan.
Georgia’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili, declared that Georgia was in a state of war, ordering government offices to work around the clock, and said that Russia was planning a full-scale invasion of his country.(9 August 2008)
Georgia: oil, neocons, cold war and our credibilityJerome a Paris, Daily Kos
This is another diary critical of the West's position on Georgia.
... First, let's be clear: there are two reasons only we care about Georgia: the oil pipelines that go through its territory, and the opportunity it provides to run aggressive policies towards Russia.
... OK, first, the oil angle.
Georgia does not have oil, but it is a transit country. This is valuable because it provides the only outlet for Caspian oil and natural gas which is not going either through Russia or through Iran. (See the maps and the wider context in that diary) And after a 15-year tug-of-war, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was inaugurated two years ago: it takes roughly 1 million barrels per day from the Azeri oil fields run by BP to the Mediterranean coast of Turkey, via Georgia. That's over 1% of world production, and it is fully controlled by Western oil majors. There is also a smaller gas pipeline that follows the same route and brings smaller volumes of gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey.
These pipelines have been at the heart of the relationship between Georgia and the USA over the past 15 years, but, oddly enough, they have played a very small role in the current crisis. In fact, the BTC pipeline has been cut off for the past few days, not because of events in Georgia (which are in the north of the country, whereas the pipelines go through the south), but because of a bomb attack in Turkey before the conflict started, with claims by the PKK, the Kurdish movement.
The reason the current conflict is not about the oil is because, now that the pipeline is built, that game is, in effect, over. Now, the only thing that could stop the flow of oil is, other than localised attacks (like the one conducted by the Kurds, something that has long been expected, and which was mitigated by building the pipeline on a route that avoids kurdish territory) would be for Russia to actually invade all of Georgia and physically take control of the pipeline, ie an outright act of war not just against Georgia, but also against the US.
The reason for that is that, as part of the process to put in place the pipeline, Georgia invited the US military to set up a base on its territory, near the route of the pipeline. Thus, any attack on the pipeline by Russia would become an attack on the USA.
But the important thing to note is that this base was not set up by the current Georgian government, but by its predecessor, that of Shevarnadze, Georgia's previous president (and, if you remember, Gorbatchev's - and the Soviet Union's - minister for foreign relations in the 80s), which was kicked out of power by Saakashvili's bunch in the rose revolution a couple of years ago - more on this below. That base was seen as a defensive gambit, and was relatively small. Indeed, with Georgia still hosting Russian military bases (see the map I posted here), anything bigger would be ... interesting. Which is what's happening today.
But before we go into the internal politics of Georgia, the thing to note at this point is that it is oil that brought the West to care about Georgia, but that this was a settled situation, and no longer a source of conflict in itself.(9 August 2008)In contrast to Jerome's analysis, the New York Times backgrounder hardly mentions oil at all:
Taunting the Bear .
Analysis: energy pipeline that supplies West threatened by war Georgia conflict
Robin
Pagnamenta, The Times
The conflict that has erupted in the Caucasus has set alarm bells ringing because of Georgia's pivotal role in the global energy market.
Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves of its own but it is a key transit point for oil from the Caspian and central Asia destined for Europe and the US.
Crucially, it is the only practical route from this increasingly important producer region that avoids both Russia and Iran.
The 1,770km (1,100 miles) Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which entered service only last year, pumps up to 1 million barrels of oil per day from Baku in Azerbaijan to Yumurtalik, Turkey, where it is loaded on to supertankers for delivery to Europe and the US. Around 249km of the route passes through Georgia, with parts running only 55km from South Ossetia.
The security of the BTC pipeline, depicted in the James Bond film The World is Not Enough, has been a primary concern since before its construction.
The first major attack on the pipeline took place only last week - not in Georgia but in Turkey where part of it was destroyed by PKK separatist rebels.(8 August 2008)
Georgia Clash Provides a Lesson on the United States’ Need for Russia
Helene Cooper, New York Times
The image of President Bush smiling and chatting with Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin of Russia from the stands of the Beijing Olympics even as Russian aircraft were shelling Georgia outlines the reality of America’s Russia policy. While America considers Georgia its strongest ally in the bloc of former Soviet countries, Washington needs Russia too much on big issues like Iran to risk it all to defend Georgia.
And State Department officials made it clear on Saturday that there was no chance the United States would intervene militarily.
... For the Bush administration, the choice now becomes whether backing Georgia - which, more than any other former Soviet republic has allied with the United States - on the South Ossetia issue is worth alienating Russia at a time when getting Russia’s help to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions is at the top of the United States’ foreign policy agenda.(9 August 2008)
Complete Story of the Articles can be found in the site:
http://energybulletin.net/node/46173
Tuesday, August 19, 2008
Bangsamoro Treaty
The Bangsamoro ‘treaty’
By Isagani A. CruzPhilippine Daily InquirerFirst Posted 21:29:00 08/09/2008
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front regarding the legal personality and rights of the so-called Bangsamoros has provoked heated debate on its validity in light of the pertinent provisions of the Constitution of 1987. Its formal signing last Tuesday was deferred by a temporary restraining older from the Supreme Court, which will hear oral arguments on the matter on Aug. 15.
This article is humbly offered for a better understanding of the agreement shorn of all its legal gobbledygook and presented in terms more familiar to the majority of our people who have not had the benefit of formal or even informal studies on the principles of our republican government.
A state is defined as a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a fixed territory, and possessed of an independent government organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. Its essential elements are people, territory, government, and sovereignty.
The term people refers to the population of the state, which may be big like the 1.3 billion of China or small like the some 400,000 only of Iceland. They must come from both sexes to perpetuate the race. Theoretically, they must be numerous enough to be self-sufficient and defend themselves but not so many as to be difficult to govern and feed.
The territory is a fixed portion of the surface of the earth consisting of the land mass known as the terrestrial domain, the internal and external waters called the maritime and fluvial domain, and the air space above the land and the waters, or the aerial domain. The components of an archipelago are integrated into one complete unit instead of being fragmented into separate islands.
Government is the instrumentality through which the will of the state is formulated, expressed and realized. It may be democratic or dictatorial, monarchial or republican, and must have jurisdiction over the inhabitants of the state and the capacity to represent it in its relations with other states.
Sovereignty means independence of the state from external control in its relations with its people and other members of the family of nations. The majority view is that it is its recognition as such that makes the state an international person and entitles it to participate in the decisions and activities of the family of nations.
I would not call the lengthy document “just a piece of paper” that does not deserve much attention. Whether it is eventually sustained or rejected by the Supreme Court, it is to me an insult per se to the democratic nature of our government and evidence of the docility of its present leadership.
The Philippines is unquestionably a state, possessing all the essential elements of statehood, with our more than 83 million population, our archipelagic territory, our rather wobbly government that is disgraced as the most corrupt in Asia, and the independence we regained in 1946 from the United States, which actually still controls us.
The MILF is only a rebellious group that our government has not even expressly recognized as a belligerent community under international law. But we are dealing with it as if it were a full-fledged state with the capacity, among other powers, to enter into treaties. Worse, it wants us to accept the Bangsamoro as a separate state with full and expressed preference “in their favor” in case of conflict with the Philippine Republic.
I do not intend to discuss the agreement in detail, assuming I have the competence to do so, which I have not at this time. The Supreme Court will eventually do this, as usual in a kilometric ponencia, with accompanying concurring and dissenting opinions. I will just say for the nonce that it contains many shocking provisions, like the recognition of the Bangsamoros as the exclusive owners of their claimed homeland covering various parts of the national territory described in Article 1 of our Constitution.
There are other incredible concessions given by the Republic of the Philippines to the Bangsamoros, such as the right to exercise powers exclusively vested in what the agreement calls the Central Government. The intention, it would seem, is to compare their ancestral domain to a component in a federation, which we are not. Moreover, the members of a federation, like the states in the United States, cannot exercise powers belonging only to the federal government, like the conduct of foreign affairs.
It is strongly suspected that the controversial agreement President Macapagal-Arroyo is endorsing is part of her scheme to replace our present Republic with a federal government where she will remain in power as its president or prime minister. She expects to do this with the controlled electoral support of the “Bangsamoro People” and the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity with which she is willing to share her authority in the governance of what the agreement grandly calls the “First Nation.”
I hope the solicitor general will not again claim the executive privilege of the President to prevent a full disclosure of the motives of the questioned agreement, which its apologists are already arrogantly calling “a done deal.” To many anxious and anguished citizens like me, it is nothing less than a treaty of surrender that should make the Republic of the Philippines bow its head in sorrow and shame.
For better understanding of the stand of the Muslims regarding this issue visit this site: http://bangsamoro.wordpress.com/
The Bangsamoro Struggle for Self-Determination
by Guiamel M. Alim, Executive Director, Kadtuntaya Foundation, Inc.
The Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination is already a struggle of generations. The longest in Asia and maybe the whole world, it started in the 16th century and up to now there is no clear indiator yet as to when it will end. Other peoples' struggle in the world have either succeeded or been totally crushed. The Moro struggle is still going on. It is an ongoing struggle for survival, cultural identity and for the right to self-determination.
The Bangsa Moro : Who are they?
Bangsa Moro ("the Moro People") is the generic name for the 13 ethnolinguistic Muslim tribes in the Philippines which constitute a quarter of the population in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. They number from 5-6 million and are found in every major island of the country. They share a distinct culture, speak different dialects, are varied in their social formation but share a common belief in Islam. This is a uniting factor among the different groups.
Of the 13 groups, there are three major groups on the bases of population and their leadership. These are the Maguindanaons (the people of the flooded plains), the Maranaos (people living around the lake) and the Tausogs (people of the current). These major groups have rallied the support of the Bangsa Moro in their struggle for self-determination.
The history of the struggle
The Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination cannot be placed in proper perspective without a brief account of the Islamic era which began in the year 1310 A.D. through the efforts of Arab traders, travellers, sufis (saintly Muslims) and Muslim missionaries. Islam as a way of life (politics, governance, economic systems, justice systems, etc.) spread and soon Islamic principalities in Sulu and Maguindanao were established. In the 15th century and early 16th century, the Sultanate of Sulu and Maguindanao came into being. Each sultanate was independent, had sovereign power and had diplomatic and trade relations with other countries in the region.
Other Muslim principalities known as emirates, like those of Rajah Solaiman in Manila and the emirates of Panay and Mindoro, were also born. This goes to show that Islam stands on record as the first political institution, the first institutional religion, the first educational system and the first civilization in the Philippines, and that its economy was far advanced than those of the other indigenous communities. But before the Bangsa Moro could fully grow into full nationstatehood, a series of foreign colonial interventions came their way.
The Complete Article found in the website:
http://www.philsol.nl/solcon/Guiamel-95.htm
GRP-MILF draft pact on Bangsamoro homeland
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) herein referred to as the “Parties” to this Agreement.
Terms of Reference
The context of referents follows:
The Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities dated July 18, 1997 Between the GRP and the MILF, and its Implementing Administrative and Operational Guidelines;
The General Framework of Agreement of Intent Between the GRP and the MILF dated August 27, 1998;
The Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF dated March 24, 2001;
The Tripoli Agreement on Peace Between the GRP and the MILF dated June 22, 2001;
The Tripoli Agreement Between the GRP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) dated December 23, 1976 and the Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement Between the GRP and the MNLF dated September 2, 1996;
Republic Act No. 6734, as amended by R.A. 9054, otherwise known as “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)”;
ILO Convention No. 169, in correlation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and Republic Act No. 8371 otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, the UN Charter; the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and internationally recognized human rights instruments; and
Compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua’hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device. For the purpose of this Agreement, a “treaty” is defined as any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understanding, obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the Agreement.
Have agreed and acknowledged as follows:
CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as “Bangsamoros”. The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected.
2. It is essential to lay the foundation of the Bangsamoro homeland in order to address the Bangsamoro people’s humanitarian and economic needs as well as their political aspirations. Such territorial jurisdictions and geographic areas being the natural wealth and patrimony represent the social, cultural and political identity and pride of all the Bangsamoro people. Ownership of the homeland is vested exclusively in them by virtue of their prior rights of occupation that had inhered in them as sizeable bodies of people, delimited by their ancestors since time immemorial, and being the first politically organized dominant occupants.
3. Both Parties acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain but encompasses ancestral, communal, and customary lands, maritime, fluvial and alluvial domains as well all natural resources therein that have inured or vested ancestral rights on the basis of native title. Ancestral domain and ancestral land refer to those held under claim of ownership, occupied or possessed, by themselves or through the ancestors of the Bangsamoro people, communally or individually since time immemorial continuously to the present, except when prevented by war, civil disturbance, force majeure, or other forms of possible usurpation or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government project or any other voluntary dealings entered into by the government and private individuals, corporate entities or institutions.
4. Both Parties acknowledge that the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people is rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The Moro sultanates were states or karajaan/kadatuan resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of nation-state in the modern sense. As a domestic community distinct from the rest of the national communities, they have a definite historic homeland. They are the “First Nation” with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations.
The Parties concede that the ultimate objective of entrenching the Bangsamoro homeland as a territorial space is to secure their identity and posterity, to protect their property rights and resources as well as to establish a system of governance suitable and acceptable to them as distinct dominant people.
5. Both Parties affirm their commitment to mutually respect the right to one’s identity and the parity of esteem of everyone in the political community. The protection of civil rights and religious liberties of individuals underlie the basis of peace and justice of their totality of relationships.
6. Both Parties agree that the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) shall have the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral lands, including both alienable and non-alienable lands encompassed within their homeland and ancestral history, as well as the delineation of ancestral domain/lands of the Bangsamoro people located therein.
7. Vested property rights upon the entrenchment of the BJE shall be recognized and respected subject to paragraph 9 of the strand on Resources.
The Complete Text of this Article can be found in the site:
http://blog.wyzemoro.com/grp-milf-draft-pact-on-bangsamoro-homeland/
By Isagani A. CruzPhilippine Daily InquirerFirst Posted 21:29:00 08/09/2008
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front regarding the legal personality and rights of the so-called Bangsamoros has provoked heated debate on its validity in light of the pertinent provisions of the Constitution of 1987. Its formal signing last Tuesday was deferred by a temporary restraining older from the Supreme Court, which will hear oral arguments on the matter on Aug. 15.
This article is humbly offered for a better understanding of the agreement shorn of all its legal gobbledygook and presented in terms more familiar to the majority of our people who have not had the benefit of formal or even informal studies on the principles of our republican government.
A state is defined as a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a fixed territory, and possessed of an independent government organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. Its essential elements are people, territory, government, and sovereignty.
The term people refers to the population of the state, which may be big like the 1.3 billion of China or small like the some 400,000 only of Iceland. They must come from both sexes to perpetuate the race. Theoretically, they must be numerous enough to be self-sufficient and defend themselves but not so many as to be difficult to govern and feed.
The territory is a fixed portion of the surface of the earth consisting of the land mass known as the terrestrial domain, the internal and external waters called the maritime and fluvial domain, and the air space above the land and the waters, or the aerial domain. The components of an archipelago are integrated into one complete unit instead of being fragmented into separate islands.
Government is the instrumentality through which the will of the state is formulated, expressed and realized. It may be democratic or dictatorial, monarchial or republican, and must have jurisdiction over the inhabitants of the state and the capacity to represent it in its relations with other states.
Sovereignty means independence of the state from external control in its relations with its people and other members of the family of nations. The majority view is that it is its recognition as such that makes the state an international person and entitles it to participate in the decisions and activities of the family of nations.
I would not call the lengthy document “just a piece of paper” that does not deserve much attention. Whether it is eventually sustained or rejected by the Supreme Court, it is to me an insult per se to the democratic nature of our government and evidence of the docility of its present leadership.
The Philippines is unquestionably a state, possessing all the essential elements of statehood, with our more than 83 million population, our archipelagic territory, our rather wobbly government that is disgraced as the most corrupt in Asia, and the independence we regained in 1946 from the United States, which actually still controls us.
The MILF is only a rebellious group that our government has not even expressly recognized as a belligerent community under international law. But we are dealing with it as if it were a full-fledged state with the capacity, among other powers, to enter into treaties. Worse, it wants us to accept the Bangsamoro as a separate state with full and expressed preference “in their favor” in case of conflict with the Philippine Republic.
I do not intend to discuss the agreement in detail, assuming I have the competence to do so, which I have not at this time. The Supreme Court will eventually do this, as usual in a kilometric ponencia, with accompanying concurring and dissenting opinions. I will just say for the nonce that it contains many shocking provisions, like the recognition of the Bangsamoros as the exclusive owners of their claimed homeland covering various parts of the national territory described in Article 1 of our Constitution.
There are other incredible concessions given by the Republic of the Philippines to the Bangsamoros, such as the right to exercise powers exclusively vested in what the agreement calls the Central Government. The intention, it would seem, is to compare their ancestral domain to a component in a federation, which we are not. Moreover, the members of a federation, like the states in the United States, cannot exercise powers belonging only to the federal government, like the conduct of foreign affairs.
It is strongly suspected that the controversial agreement President Macapagal-Arroyo is endorsing is part of her scheme to replace our present Republic with a federal government where she will remain in power as its president or prime minister. She expects to do this with the controlled electoral support of the “Bangsamoro People” and the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity with which she is willing to share her authority in the governance of what the agreement grandly calls the “First Nation.”
I hope the solicitor general will not again claim the executive privilege of the President to prevent a full disclosure of the motives of the questioned agreement, which its apologists are already arrogantly calling “a done deal.” To many anxious and anguished citizens like me, it is nothing less than a treaty of surrender that should make the Republic of the Philippines bow its head in sorrow and shame.
For better understanding of the stand of the Muslims regarding this issue visit this site: http://bangsamoro.wordpress.com/
The Bangsamoro Struggle for Self-Determination
by Guiamel M. Alim, Executive Director, Kadtuntaya Foundation, Inc.
The Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination is already a struggle of generations. The longest in Asia and maybe the whole world, it started in the 16th century and up to now there is no clear indiator yet as to when it will end. Other peoples' struggle in the world have either succeeded or been totally crushed. The Moro struggle is still going on. It is an ongoing struggle for survival, cultural identity and for the right to self-determination.
The Bangsa Moro : Who are they?
Bangsa Moro ("the Moro People") is the generic name for the 13 ethnolinguistic Muslim tribes in the Philippines which constitute a quarter of the population in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. They number from 5-6 million and are found in every major island of the country. They share a distinct culture, speak different dialects, are varied in their social formation but share a common belief in Islam. This is a uniting factor among the different groups.
Of the 13 groups, there are three major groups on the bases of population and their leadership. These are the Maguindanaons (the people of the flooded plains), the Maranaos (people living around the lake) and the Tausogs (people of the current). These major groups have rallied the support of the Bangsa Moro in their struggle for self-determination.
The history of the struggle
The Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination cannot be placed in proper perspective without a brief account of the Islamic era which began in the year 1310 A.D. through the efforts of Arab traders, travellers, sufis (saintly Muslims) and Muslim missionaries. Islam as a way of life (politics, governance, economic systems, justice systems, etc.) spread and soon Islamic principalities in Sulu and Maguindanao were established. In the 15th century and early 16th century, the Sultanate of Sulu and Maguindanao came into being. Each sultanate was independent, had sovereign power and had diplomatic and trade relations with other countries in the region.
Other Muslim principalities known as emirates, like those of Rajah Solaiman in Manila and the emirates of Panay and Mindoro, were also born. This goes to show that Islam stands on record as the first political institution, the first institutional religion, the first educational system and the first civilization in the Philippines, and that its economy was far advanced than those of the other indigenous communities. But before the Bangsa Moro could fully grow into full nationstatehood, a series of foreign colonial interventions came their way.
The Complete Article found in the website:
http://www.philsol.nl/solcon/Guiamel-95.htm
GRP-MILF draft pact on Bangsamoro homeland
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) herein referred to as the “Parties” to this Agreement.
Terms of Reference
The context of referents follows:
The Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities dated July 18, 1997 Between the GRP and the MILF, and its Implementing Administrative and Operational Guidelines;
The General Framework of Agreement of Intent Between the GRP and the MILF dated August 27, 1998;
The Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF dated March 24, 2001;
The Tripoli Agreement on Peace Between the GRP and the MILF dated June 22, 2001;
The Tripoli Agreement Between the GRP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) dated December 23, 1976 and the Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement Between the GRP and the MNLF dated September 2, 1996;
Republic Act No. 6734, as amended by R.A. 9054, otherwise known as “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)”;
ILO Convention No. 169, in correlation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and Republic Act No. 8371 otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, the UN Charter; the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and internationally recognized human rights instruments; and
Compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua’hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device. For the purpose of this Agreement, a “treaty” is defined as any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understanding, obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the Agreement.
Have agreed and acknowledged as follows:
CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as “Bangsamoros”. The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected.
2. It is essential to lay the foundation of the Bangsamoro homeland in order to address the Bangsamoro people’s humanitarian and economic needs as well as their political aspirations. Such territorial jurisdictions and geographic areas being the natural wealth and patrimony represent the social, cultural and political identity and pride of all the Bangsamoro people. Ownership of the homeland is vested exclusively in them by virtue of their prior rights of occupation that had inhered in them as sizeable bodies of people, delimited by their ancestors since time immemorial, and being the first politically organized dominant occupants.
3. Both Parties acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain but encompasses ancestral, communal, and customary lands, maritime, fluvial and alluvial domains as well all natural resources therein that have inured or vested ancestral rights on the basis of native title. Ancestral domain and ancestral land refer to those held under claim of ownership, occupied or possessed, by themselves or through the ancestors of the Bangsamoro people, communally or individually since time immemorial continuously to the present, except when prevented by war, civil disturbance, force majeure, or other forms of possible usurpation or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government project or any other voluntary dealings entered into by the government and private individuals, corporate entities or institutions.
4. Both Parties acknowledge that the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people is rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The Moro sultanates were states or karajaan/kadatuan resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of nation-state in the modern sense. As a domestic community distinct from the rest of the national communities, they have a definite historic homeland. They are the “First Nation” with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations.
The Parties concede that the ultimate objective of entrenching the Bangsamoro homeland as a territorial space is to secure their identity and posterity, to protect their property rights and resources as well as to establish a system of governance suitable and acceptable to them as distinct dominant people.
5. Both Parties affirm their commitment to mutually respect the right to one’s identity and the parity of esteem of everyone in the political community. The protection of civil rights and religious liberties of individuals underlie the basis of peace and justice of their totality of relationships.
6. Both Parties agree that the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) shall have the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral lands, including both alienable and non-alienable lands encompassed within their homeland and ancestral history, as well as the delineation of ancestral domain/lands of the Bangsamoro people located therein.
7. Vested property rights upon the entrenchment of the BJE shall be recognized and respected subject to paragraph 9 of the strand on Resources.
The Complete Text of this Article can be found in the site:
http://blog.wyzemoro.com/grp-milf-draft-pact-on-bangsamoro-homeland/
Thursday, August 14, 2008
Question on Pimentel vs Exe. Sec,
This question is regarding the case filed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary. In that case, the Court dismissed the petition of Sen. Pimentel ruling that:
The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the county’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.
In addition, the Court emphasized that under the Constitution, ‘the power to ratify is vested in the President, SUBJECT TO THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE.’(capitalizing letters supplied to emphasize)
MY QUESTION:
Why is it expressly stated in the Constitution and in this ruling the phrase “SUBJECT TO THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE”, when such concurrence is NOT NECESSARY AND NOT BINDING?
Pimentel Jr. vs Office of the Exe. Sec.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. et al. vs. Office of the Executive Secretary represented by Hon. Alberto Romulo, Department of Foreign Affairs represented by Hon. Blas Ople
G. R. No. 158088. July 6, 2005
FACTS:
On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute was opened for signature at its headquarter in New York. On December 28, 2000, three days before its deadline for signing, the Philippines through its Charge d’ Affairs, Enrique A. Manalo signed the Statute. By its provision, however, it is requiring that it be ratified by the accepting states.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, file this petition to compel the Hon. Alberto Romulo (Executive Secretary) and Hon. Blas Ople (Department of Foreign Affairs) – respondents in this case – to transmit the signed document to the Senate for ratification.
Hon. Alberto Romulo and Hon. Blas Ople, on the other hand, argue that they as representative of the Executive Department have no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
ISSUE:
Who has the power to ratify the Rome Statute?
HELD:
The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the county’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.
The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
Thus, this petition is DISMISSED. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
Monday, August 4, 2008
LINKS TO ICC
LIST OF LINKS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
1. International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court)
2. Crime against humanity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime_against_humanity )
3. Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court#Jurisdiction)
4. Genocide definitions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocide_definitions)
5. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_the_Prevention_and_Punishment_of_the_Crime_of_Genocide)
6. Victim participation and reparations
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court#Victim_participation_and_reparations)
7. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm)
8. Stages of genocide and efforts to prevent it (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocide#Stages_of_genocide_and_efforts_to_prevent_it)
9. International Criminal Court: Information and Much More from Answer.com
(http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/index.htm)
10. United States and the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_and_the_International_Criminal_Court)
11. Judges of the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judges_of_the_International_Criminal_Court)
12. People detained by the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People_detained_by_the_International_Criminal_Court#Detention_centre)
13.Cases before the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cases_before_the_International_Criminal_Court)
14. Complaints to the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complaints_to_the_International_Criminal_Court)
15. The International Criminal Court and the 2003 invasion of Iraq (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_International_Criminal_Court_and_the_2003_invasion_of_Iraq)
16. International Criminal Court
(http://www.icc-cpi.int/home.html)
17. Coalition for the International Criminal Court (http://www.icc-cpi.int/home.html)
18. States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Parties_of_the_International_Criminal_Court)
19. The International Criminal Court: An End To Impunity? (http://www.crimesofwar.org/icc_magazine/icc-intro.html)
20. The International Criminal Court: Global Policy Forum (http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/index.htm)
1. International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court)
2. Crime against humanity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime_against_humanity )
3. Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court#Jurisdiction)
4. Genocide definitions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocide_definitions)
5. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_the_Prevention_and_Punishment_of_the_Crime_of_Genocide)
6. Victim participation and reparations
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court#Victim_participation_and_reparations)
7. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm)
8. Stages of genocide and efforts to prevent it (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocide#Stages_of_genocide_and_efforts_to_prevent_it)
9. International Criminal Court: Information and Much More from Answer.com
(http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/index.htm)
10. United States and the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_and_the_International_Criminal_Court)
11. Judges of the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judges_of_the_International_Criminal_Court)
12. People detained by the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People_detained_by_the_International_Criminal_Court#Detention_centre)
13.Cases before the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cases_before_the_International_Criminal_Court)
14. Complaints to the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complaints_to_the_International_Criminal_Court)
15. The International Criminal Court and the 2003 invasion of Iraq (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_International_Criminal_Court_and_the_2003_invasion_of_Iraq)
16. International Criminal Court
(http://www.icc-cpi.int/home.html)
17. Coalition for the International Criminal Court (http://www.icc-cpi.int/home.html)
18. States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Parties_of_the_International_Criminal_Court)
19. The International Criminal Court: An End To Impunity? (http://www.crimesofwar.org/icc_magazine/icc-intro.html)
20. The International Criminal Court: Global Policy Forum (http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/index.htm)
RECOGNITION PRINCIPLE
Different Principles in Recognizing States
A. Tobar or Wilson Principle
Examples
1. The Baltic States
2. Croatia and Slovenia Unrecognized
B. Stimpson Doctrine
Historical Basis
C. Estrada Doctrine
Example
Ukraine's Independence
A. Tobar or Wilson Principle
Under this principle, it is suggested that recognition shall not be extended to any government established by revolution, civil war, coup d’etat or other forms of internal violence until the freely elected representatives of the people have organized a constitutional government.
Examples.
1. The Baltic States
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were recognized as independent states in the early 1920's. The United States, announced its de jure recognition on 28 July 1922 after noting `the successful maintenance within their borders of political and economic stability' by the governments of the three Baltic states.
2. Croatia and Slovenia Unrecognized
On 25 June 1991, both Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. The Constitutional Resolution Regarding the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia adopted by the Croatian Parliament based its actions `upon the will of the nation demonstrated at the referendum of 19 May 1991,' and argued that `the SFRY no longer is acting as the constitutional-legal organized state.' Article I of the Resolution proclaims Croatia as a sovereign and independent state. Interestingly, however, Article II states that Croatia thus `begins the process of disassociation from the other republics of the SFRY' and `begins the process of gaining international recognition.'
B. Stimpson Doctrine
It was “ incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.”
Historical Basis:
The policy of expansionism in China pursued by the autonomous Kwantung Army of Japan accelerated in the late 1920s and early 1930s and became a major concern of the U.S. government. On September 18, 1931, Japanese soldiers guarding the South Manchurian Railway blew up part of the track in order to manufacture an excuse to seize Manchuria proper. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson reacted to what he regarded as a violation of international law as well as treaties that the Japanese Government had signed. Since calls for a cessation of hostilities between China and Japan failed and President Herbert Hoover had rejected economic sanctions in principle, Stimson declared in January 1932 that the U.S. Government would not recognize any territorial or administrative changes the Japanese might impose upon China. The Stimson Doctrine was echoed in March 1932 by the Assembly of the League of Nations, which unanimously adopted an anti-Japanese resolution incorporating virtually verbatim the Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition. However, as the Secretary of State later realized, he had at his disposal only "spears of straws and swords of ice." In short order, Japanese representatives simply walked out of the League, and the Kwangtung Army formalized its conquest of Manchuria by establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo under former Chinese emperor Pu-Yi. When war between Japan and China broke out following a minor clash between military units at the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937, the impotence of the "Stimson Doctrine" became even more apparent.
C. Estrada Doctrine
Under this doctrine, it is declared that it would, as it saw fit, continue or terminate its relations with any country in which a political upheaval had taken place “ and in so doing it does not pronounce judgment, regarding the right of foreign nations to accept, maintain or replace their governments or authorities.
Example:
Ukraine's Independence
Like other Soviet republics, Ukraine had declared its sovereignty on 16 July 1990. Many observers saw this declaration, and that of Byelorussia of 27 July 1990, in terms of jockeying for economic advantage in the process of the devolution of power from the centre. On 24 August 1991, after the collapse of the Moscow coup, Ukraine went one step further by declaring its independence and Byelorussia followed suit the next day. Ukraine's Declaration of Independence was, however, made subject to the results of a referendum to be held on 1 December 1991 and countries accordingly had good reason to hold off consideration of recognition until that time.
To the surprise of most observers who had underestimated the support for independence in Ukraine, participation in the referendum was over 80% and the vote in favour exceeded 90%. The referendum result effectively completed the Declaration of Independence and other countries had no further excuse to hold off consideration of recognition. But there was one strong political factor militating against early recognition. President Gorbachev was working towards a Union Treaty which would preserve a Soviet centre and countries were loathe to undercut the stability that such a move seemed to represent, particularly in terms of continuing Soviet acceptance of its obligations under the various disarmament treaties.Canada, home to a large community tracing its origins to Ukraine, decided not to wait for Gorbachev's Union Treaty. On 2 December 1991, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that Canada had decided to recognize Ukraine as an independent state. The Canadian statement referred to the overwhelming support for independence in the referendum and undertook to enter into negotiations on diplomatic relations noting that `as part of these negotiations, Canada will wish to be satisfied with respect to Ukraine's stated intentions that it will ensure that nuclear weapons remain under secure control until they are disposed of, comply with existing arms control, disarmament and other international agreements, and adhere to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and other CSCE documents, with particular attention to full respect for human rights and protection of minorities.
A. Tobar or Wilson Principle
Examples
1. The Baltic States
2. Croatia and Slovenia Unrecognized
B. Stimpson Doctrine
Historical Basis
C. Estrada Doctrine
Example
Ukraine's Independence
A. Tobar or Wilson Principle
Under this principle, it is suggested that recognition shall not be extended to any government established by revolution, civil war, coup d’etat or other forms of internal violence until the freely elected representatives of the people have organized a constitutional government.
Examples.
1. The Baltic States
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were recognized as independent states in the early 1920's. The United States, announced its de jure recognition on 28 July 1922 after noting `the successful maintenance within their borders of political and economic stability' by the governments of the three Baltic states.
2. Croatia and Slovenia Unrecognized
On 25 June 1991, both Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. The Constitutional Resolution Regarding the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia adopted by the Croatian Parliament based its actions `upon the will of the nation demonstrated at the referendum of 19 May 1991,' and argued that `the SFRY no longer is acting as the constitutional-legal organized state.' Article I of the Resolution proclaims Croatia as a sovereign and independent state. Interestingly, however, Article II states that Croatia thus `begins the process of disassociation from the other republics of the SFRY' and `begins the process of gaining international recognition.'
B. Stimpson Doctrine
It was “ incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.”
Historical Basis:
The policy of expansionism in China pursued by the autonomous Kwantung Army of Japan accelerated in the late 1920s and early 1930s and became a major concern of the U.S. government. On September 18, 1931, Japanese soldiers guarding the South Manchurian Railway blew up part of the track in order to manufacture an excuse to seize Manchuria proper. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson reacted to what he regarded as a violation of international law as well as treaties that the Japanese Government had signed. Since calls for a cessation of hostilities between China and Japan failed and President Herbert Hoover had rejected economic sanctions in principle, Stimson declared in January 1932 that the U.S. Government would not recognize any territorial or administrative changes the Japanese might impose upon China. The Stimson Doctrine was echoed in March 1932 by the Assembly of the League of Nations, which unanimously adopted an anti-Japanese resolution incorporating virtually verbatim the Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition. However, as the Secretary of State later realized, he had at his disposal only "spears of straws and swords of ice." In short order, Japanese representatives simply walked out of the League, and the Kwangtung Army formalized its conquest of Manchuria by establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo under former Chinese emperor Pu-Yi. When war between Japan and China broke out following a minor clash between military units at the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937, the impotence of the "Stimson Doctrine" became even more apparent.
C. Estrada Doctrine
Under this doctrine, it is declared that it would, as it saw fit, continue or terminate its relations with any country in which a political upheaval had taken place “ and in so doing it does not pronounce judgment, regarding the right of foreign nations to accept, maintain or replace their governments or authorities.
Example:
Ukraine's Independence
Like other Soviet republics, Ukraine had declared its sovereignty on 16 July 1990. Many observers saw this declaration, and that of Byelorussia of 27 July 1990, in terms of jockeying for economic advantage in the process of the devolution of power from the centre. On 24 August 1991, after the collapse of the Moscow coup, Ukraine went one step further by declaring its independence and Byelorussia followed suit the next day. Ukraine's Declaration of Independence was, however, made subject to the results of a referendum to be held on 1 December 1991 and countries accordingly had good reason to hold off consideration of recognition until that time.
To the surprise of most observers who had underestimated the support for independence in Ukraine, participation in the referendum was over 80% and the vote in favour exceeded 90%. The referendum result effectively completed the Declaration of Independence and other countries had no further excuse to hold off consideration of recognition. But there was one strong political factor militating against early recognition. President Gorbachev was working towards a Union Treaty which would preserve a Soviet centre and countries were loathe to undercut the stability that such a move seemed to represent, particularly in terms of continuing Soviet acceptance of its obligations under the various disarmament treaties.Canada, home to a large community tracing its origins to Ukraine, decided not to wait for Gorbachev's Union Treaty. On 2 December 1991, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that Canada had decided to recognize Ukraine as an independent state. The Canadian statement referred to the overwhelming support for independence in the referendum and undertook to enter into negotiations on diplomatic relations noting that `as part of these negotiations, Canada will wish to be satisfied with respect to Ukraine's stated intentions that it will ensure that nuclear weapons remain under secure control until they are disposed of, comply with existing arms control, disarmament and other international agreements, and adhere to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and other CSCE documents, with particular attention to full respect for human rights and protection of minorities.
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
FACTS:
On February 1986, President Ferdinand E Marcos was deposed from presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and forced in to exile together with his family members.
President Cory Aquino was declared President of the Republic of the Philippines under a revolutionary government but her government was not free from threats. There were the different coup attempts headed by either the loyalist of the former president like Col. Canlas, or by rebel soldiers like Gringo Honasan. The forces of the NPA had not been uprooted. They also pose a considerable threat to the government.
Moreover, the economy of the country is still devastated and the efforts for economic recovery have yet to show concrete results, while the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has not been recovered.
Now, Mr. Marcos petition the court to return to the Philippines to die in his homeland. Considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when stability of the government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED. The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
FACTS:
On February 1986, President Ferdinand E Marcos was deposed from presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and forced in to exile together with his family members.
President Cory Aquino was declared President of the Republic of the Philippines under a revolutionary government but her government was not free from threats. There were the different coup attempts headed by either the loyalist of the former president like Col. Canlas, or by rebel soldiers like Gringo Honasan. The forces of the NPA had not been uprooted. They also pose a considerable threat to the government.
Moreover, the economy of the country is still devastated and the efforts for economic recovery have yet to show concrete results, while the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has not been recovered.
Now, Mr. Marcos petition the court to return to the Philippines to die in his homeland. Considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when stability of the government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED. The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear.
ICMC VS CALLEJA
G. R. No. 85750 Sept. 28, 1990.
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, petitioner vs. HON. PURA CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS) WFTU respondents.
FACTS:
ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in Morong Bataan, is a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative status II. It has the activities parallel to those of the International Committee for Migrtion (ICM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
On July 14, 1986, Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by the ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it enjoys diplomatic immunity.
On Februaury 5, 1987 Med – Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition of TUPAS for lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, The Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations reversed the Med – Arbiter’s Decisionand ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election.
This present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction assailing the BLR Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws.
HELD:
The Petition is GRANTED, the order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for Certification election is SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued is made PERMANENT.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.
BASIS:
Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have a status “similar to that of a specialized agency.”
Article III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, petitioner vs. HON. PURA CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS) WFTU respondents.
FACTS:
ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in Morong Bataan, is a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative status II. It has the activities parallel to those of the International Committee for Migrtion (ICM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
On July 14, 1986, Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by the ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it enjoys diplomatic immunity.
On Februaury 5, 1987 Med – Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition of TUPAS for lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, The Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations reversed the Med – Arbiter’s Decisionand ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election.
This present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction assailing the BLR Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws.
HELD:
The Petition is GRANTED, the order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for Certification election is SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued is made PERMANENT.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.
BASIS:
Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have a status “similar to that of a specialized agency.”
Article III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.
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