THE MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT - 2008

THE MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT - 2008

http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/The%20Millennium%20Development%20Goals%20Report%202008.pdf


The eight Millennium Development Goals have been adopted by the international community as a framework for the development activities of over 190 countries in ten regions; they have been articulated into over 20 targets and over 60 indicators. This Report summarizes progress towards the goals in each of the regions. However, any such synthesis inevitably masks the range and variety of development experiences in individual countries since the goals were adopted.


Mid-point shows some key successes

The single most important success to date has been the unprecedented breadth and depth of the commitment to the MDGs – a global collective effort that is unsurpassed in 50 years of development experience. It is not only governments of developing countries and the international community that have adopted the MDGs as their framework for international development cooperation, but also the private sector and, critically, civil society in both developed and developing countries. Besides being advocates for the MDGs, private foundations in the developed countries have become an important source of funding for a wide range of activities intended to achieve them. NGOs in developing countries are increasingly engaged in undertaking these activities, as well as in monitoring the
outcomes.

This global collective effort is yielding results. Adding more recent data to those contained in earlier Reports largely confirms the patterns identified previously. There has been sound progress in some MDG areas, even in some of the more challenging regions, and a number of targets are expected to be reached by their target dates, mostly 2015:

• The overarching goal of reducing absolute poverty by half is within reach for the world as a whole;
• In all but two regions, primary school enrolment is at least 90 per cent;
• The gender parity index in primary education is 95 per cent or higher in six of the 10 regions, including the most populous ones;
• Deaths from measles fell from over 750,000 in 2000 to less than 250,000 in 2006, and about 80 per cent of children in developing countries now receive a measles vaccine;
• The number of deaths from AIDS fell from 2.2 million in 2005 to 2.0 million in 2007, and the number of people newly infected declined from 3.0 million in 2001 to 2.7 million in 2007;
• Malaria prevention is expanding, with widespread increases in insecticide-treated net use among children under five in sub-Saharan Africa: in 16 out of 20 countries, use has at least tripled since around 2000.
• The incidence of tuberculosis is expected to be halted and begin to decline before the target date of 2015;
• Some 1.6 billion people have gained access to safe drinking water since 1990;
• The use of ozone-depleting substances has been almost eliminated and this has contributed to the effort to reduce global warming;
• The share of developing countries’ export earnings devoted to servicing external debt fell from 12.5 per cent in 2000 to 6.6 per cent in 2006, allowing them to allocate more resources to reducing poverty;
• The private sector has increased the availability of some critical essential drugs and rapidly spread mobile phone technology throughout the developing world.


GOAL # 1: ERADICATE EXTREME POVERTY AND HUNGER

TARGET:

Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day

MDG REPORT:

Higher food prices may push 100 million people deeper into poverty

New data, based on the latest estimates of the cost of living in developing countries, may change our view of the scale and distribution of global poverty. But the continuing economic growth in all developing regions suggests that the downward trend in poverty continued through 2007. The goal of cutting in half the proportion of people in the developing world living on less than $1 a day by 2015 remains within reach. However, this achievement will be due largely to extraordinary economic success in most of Asia. In contrast, previous estimates suggest that little progress was made in reducing extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. In Western Asia, poverty rates were relatively low but increasing. And the transition economies of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and South-Eastern Europe were still recovering from the rise in poverty in the early 1990s.


GOAL # 2: ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION

TARGET:

Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

MDG REPORT:

Political will, coupled with targeted investments, have yielded widespread progress in primary school enrolment

In almost all regions, the net enrolment ratio in 2006 exceeded 90 per cent, and many countries were close to achieving universal primary enrolment. The number of children of primary school age who were out of school fell from 103 million in 1999 to 73 million in 2006, despite an overall increase in the number of
children in this age group.


GOAL # 3: PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY AND EMPOWER WOMEN


TARGET:

Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015

MDG REPORT:

Girls still wait for equal primary school access in some regions

School doors have swung open for girls in nearly all regions as many countries have successfully promoted girls’ education as part of their efforts to boost overall enrolment. Girls’ primary enrolment increased more than boys’ in all developing regions between 2000 and 2006. As a result, two out of three countries have achieved gender parity at the primary level. Despite impressive gains, girls account for 55 per cent of the out-of-school population.

Targeted action is needed to help girls from poor, rural areas stay in school

In developing countries, primary school attendance of girls and boys is nearly equal in the richest households and in urban areas. However, girls in rural areas
and from the poorest households require targeted interventions to encourage them to enrol in and stay in school. Satellite schools in remote areas, eliminating
school fees, providing school meals, constructing separate sanitation facilities, ensuring a safe school environment and promoting later marriage have boosted girls’ attendance in school.


GOAL # 4: REDUCE CHILD MORTALITY

TARGET:

Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate

MDG REPORT:

Despite progress, deaths of under five children remain unacceptably high

In 2006, for the first time since mortality data have been gathered, annual deaths among children under five dipped below 10 million. Nevertheless, the death of
millions of children from preventable causes each year is unacceptable. A child born in a developing country is over 13 times more likely to die within the first five
years of life than a child born in an industrialized country. Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for about half the deaths of children under five in the developing world.
Between 1990 and 2006, about 27 countries – the large majority in sub-Saharan Africa – made no progress in reducing childhood deaths. In Eastern Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, child mortality rates are approximately four times higher than in developed regions. Disparities persist in all regions: mortality rates are higher for children from rural and poor families and whose mothers lack a basic education.

GOAL # 5: IMPROVE MATERNAL HEALTH

TARGET:

Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio

MDG REPORT:

The high risk of dying in pregnancy or childbirth continues unabated in sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia

Maternal mortality remains unacceptably high across much of the developing world. In 2005, more than 500,000 women died during pregnancy, childbirth or in the six weeks after delivery. Ninety-nine per cent of these deaths occurred in the developing regions, with sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia accounting for 86 per cent of them. In sub-Saharan Africa, a woman’s risk of dying from treatable or preventable complications of pregnancy and childbirth over the course of her lifetime is 1 in 22 , compared to 1 in 7,300 in the developed regions.

GOAL # 6: COMBAT HIV/AIDS, MALARIA AND OTHER DISEASES

TARGET:

Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

MDG REPORT:

Despite small victories, AIDS continues to take a terrible toll, especially in sub-Saharan Africa

Every day, nearly 7,500 people become infected with HIV and 5,500 die from AIDS, mostly due to a lack of HIV prevention and treatment services. Despite these staggering numbers, some encouraging developments have sparked small victories in the battle against AIDS. Thanks to improvements in prevention programmes, the number of people newly infected with HIV declined from 3 million in 2001 to 2.7 million in 2007. And with the expansion of antiretroviral treatment services, the number of people who die from AIDS has started to decline, from 2.2 million in 2005 to 2.0 million in 2007. However, largely because newly infected people survive longer, the number of people living with HIV rose
from an estimated 29.5 million in 2001 to 33 million in 2007. The vast majority of those living with HIV are in sub-Saharan Africa.



TARGET:

Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

MDG REPORT:

Despite tremendous progress, use of insecticide-treated mosquito nets falls short of global targets


The number of insecticide-treated mosquito nets produced worldwide jumped from 30 million in 2004 to 95 million in 2007. Coupled with increased resources, this has led to a rapid rise in the number of mosquito nets procured and distributed within countries. For example, UNICEF increased its procurement from 7 million in 2004 to nearly 20 million in 2007, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria increased its distribution from 1.35 million in 2004 to 18 million in 2006. As a result, all sub-Saharan African countries for which there are trend data showed increases in insecticide-treated net use among children under five; 16 of these 20 countries have at least tripled their coverage since around 2000. Despite this progress, overall insecticide-treated net use falls short of global targets.


GOAL #7: ENSURE ENVIROMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

TARGET:

Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources

MDG REPORT:

Immediate action is needed to contain rising greenhouse gas emissions

In 2007, the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change made it abundantly clear that the climate is warming and
“most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic
greenhouse gas.” Carbon dioxide (CO2) released by the burning of fossil fuels accounts for more than half of the global greenhouse gas emissions responsible for climate change.


TARGET:

By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at l east 100 million slum dwellers


MDG REPORT:

Simple, low-cost interventions could significantly improve the lives of many slum dwellers The lack of improved sanitation and water facilities are two of the four defining characteristics of urban slums. The others are durable housing and sufficient living area. In 2005, slightly more than one third of the urban population in developing regions lived in slum conditions; in sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion was over 60 per cent.


GOAL #8: DEVELOP FOR GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT

TARGET;

Address the special needs of the least developed countries, landlocked
countries and small island developing states

MDG REPORT:

Development assistance will have to increase substantially to double aid to Africa by 2010

Total aid remains well below the United Nations target of 0.7 per cent of the gross national income (GNI) of the members of the Development Assistance
Committee of the OECD. Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden were the only countries to reach or exceed this target in 2007. For the
developed countries as a group, official development assistance fell to 0.28 per cent of their combined gross national income in 2007.

TARGET:

Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system

MDG REPORT:

Market access for most developing countries is little improved

There has been little progress recently in reducing the barriers to exports from developing countries to developed countries. The 2005 World Trade Organization Agreement on Textiles and Clothing liberalized trade in those sectors, benefiting some developing and least developed countries while hurting others, including several least developed countries in Africa and upper-middle-income countries in Eastern Asia. In December 2005, the developed country members of the World Trade Organization vowed that, by 2008, they would make
at least 97 per cent of their tariff lines duty-free and quota-free for imports originating from least developed countries.

DBM vs KOLONWEL TRADING

G. R. No. 175608

June 8, 2007

DEPARTMENT O BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT PROCUREMENT SERVICE (DBM-PS) and the inter-Agency Bids and Awards Committee (IABAC), petetioners VS. KOLONWEL TRADING, respondent.



ISSUE:

Whether or not the foreign loan agreements (Loan No. 7118-PH) with international financial institutions, partake of an executive or international agreement and shall govern the procurement of goods necessary to implement the project.


HELD:

This issue has been affirmatively answered in the case of Abaya. In that case, the court declared that the RP-JBIC loan agreement was to be of governing application over the CP I project and that the JBIC Procurement Guidelines, as stipulated in the loan agreement.

Under the fundamental international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, the RP, as borrower, bound itself to perform in good faith its duties and obligation under Loan No. 7118-PH. Applying this postulate, the IABAC was legally obliged to comply with, or accord primacy to, the WB Guidelines on the conduct and implementation of the bidding/procurement process in question.

Plaridel M. Abaya vs. Hon. Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.

G. R. No. 167919

February 14, 2007

Plaridel M. Abaya vs. Hon. Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.

FACTS:

On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. It was approved by DPWH Acting Secretary Florante Soriquez. This resolution recommended the award to China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract for the implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP I), which consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the lengt of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of Catanduanes.

This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and between the JBIC and the Philippine Government pursuant to the exchange of Notes executed by and between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their respective governments.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204 between the JBIC and the Philippine Government is a kind of a treaty.


HELD:

The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999 between the Japanese Government and the Philippine Government is an executive agreement.

An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other.

…treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes all are refer to international instruments binding at international law.

Although these instruments differ from each other by title, they all have common features and international law has applied basically the same rules to all these instruments. These rules are the result of long practice among the States, which have accepted them as binding norms in their mutual relations. Therefore, they are regarded as international customary law.

Bayan vs Zamora

G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000

Bayan vs Zamora

Facts:

The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.


Cause of Action:

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

ISSUE:

Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

HELD:

Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

Gov. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Hon. Felixberto Olalia

G.R. No. 153675

Gov. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Hon. Felixberto Olalia


FACTS:

Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before the Hongkong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of “accepting an advantage as an agent”, conspiracy to defraud, was penalized by a common law of Hongkong. A warrant of arrest was issued and if convicted, he may face jail terms.

On September 23, 1999, He was arrested and detained.

On November 22, 1999, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for his extradition.

Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which Judge Felixberto Olalia granted.

Petitioner (Hongkong Administrative), filed a petition to vacate such order, but it was denied by the same judge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post bail when there is nothing in the Constitution or Statutory law providing a potential extradite a right to bail.

HELD:

The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person (Sec. 2 Art II 1987 Constitution) have the obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.

The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, aright to due process under the Constitution.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.

Answer to Question Nos. 2 & 3 of 2008 Bar Exam-Political & International Law

QUESTION NO. 2

May a treaty violate international law? If your answer is in the affirmative, explain when such may happen. If your answer is in the negative, explain why.


Answer:

Yes, a treaty may be a violation to international law. It happens when the subject matter of the treaty of the contracting parties can not be legally complied with because it is forbidden by universally recognized principle of international law. The treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 which is sought to divide between Spain and Portugal parts of the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, which are open seas under the law of nations is an example of a treaty which is a violation of international law.


QUESTION NO. 3

The President alone without the concurrence of the senate abrogated a treaty. Assume that the other country-party to the treaty is agreeable to the abrogation provided it complies with the Philippine Constitution. If a case involving the validity of the treaty abrogation is brought to the Supreme Court, how should it be resolved?


Answer:

It could be resolved by applying the legal principle established in the case of Senator Pimentel Jr. vs. Office of the Executive Secretary G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005. In that case, Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. file a petition to compel Executive Secretary Hon. Alberto Romulo and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Hon. Blas Ople to transmit the signed documents – The Rome Statute which was signed by Charge d’ Affairs Enrique Manalo – to transmit it to the Senate for ratification.

Hon. Alberto Romulo and Hon. Blas Ople, on the other hand, argue that they as representative of the Executive Department have no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.

The Court settled the issue by declaring that: The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.

The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

R. A. No. 75

REPUBLIC ACT No. 75

AN ACT TO PENALIZE ACTS WHICH WOULD IMPAIR THE PROPER OBSERVANCE BY THE REPUBLIC AND INHABITANTS OF THE PHILIPPINES OF THE IMMUNITIES, RIGHT, AND PRIVILEGES OF DULY ACCREDITED FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Section 1. Any person who shall falsely assume and take upon himself to act as a diplomatic, consular, or any other official of a foreign government duly accredited as such to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines with intent to defraud such foreign government or the Government of the Philippines, or any person, or in such pretended character shall demand or obtain, or attempt to obtain from person or from said foreign government or the Government of the Philippines, or from any officer thereof, any money, paper, document, or other thing, of value, shall be fined not more than five thousand pesos, or shall be imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, in addition to the penalties that may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code.

Section 2. Any person, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attach, who shall act in the Republic of the Philippines as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to, and registration with, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall be fined not more than five thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, aside from other penalties that may be imposed by law.

Section 3. Any person, who with intent to deceive or mislead, within the jurisdiction of the Republic, wear any naval, military, police, or other official uniform, decoration, or regalia of any foreign State, nation or government with which the Republic of the Philippines is at peace, or any uniform, decoration or regalia so nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive, unless such wearing thereof be authorized by such State, nation, or government, shall upon conviction, be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.1awphil-itc-alf

Section 4. Any writ or process sued out or prosecuted by any person in any court of the Republic of the Philippines, or by any judge or justice, whereby the person of any ambassador or public minister of any foreign State, authorized and received as such by the President, or any domestic or domestic servant of any such ambassador or minister is arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or chattels are distrained, seized, or attached, shall be deemed void, and every person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in executing it, shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos in the discretion of the court.

Section 5. The provisions of section four hereof shall not apply to any case where the person against whom the process is issued is a citizen or inhabitant of the Republic of the Philippines, in the service of an ambassador or a public minister, and the process is founded upon a debt contracted before he entered upon such service; nor shall the said section apply to any case where the person against whom the process is issued is a domestic servant of an ambassador or a public minister, unless the name of the servant has, before the issuing thereof, been registered in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and transmitted by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Chief of Police of the City of Manila, who shall upon receipt thereof post the same in some public place in his office. All persons shall have resort to the list of names so posted in the office of the Chief of Police, and take copies without fee.

Section 6. Any person who assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons or in any other manner offers violence to the person of an ambassador or a public minister, in violation of the law of nations, shall be imprisoned not more than three years, and fined not exceeding two hundred pesos, in the discretion of the court, in addition to the penalties that may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code.

Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall be applicable only in case where the country of the diplomatic or consular representative adversely affected has provided for similar protection to duly accredited diplomatic or consular representatives of the Republic of the Philippines by prescribing like or similar penalties for like or similar offenses herein contained.
Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: October 21, 1946

vienna conventions-diplomatic & consular relations

CONTENTS

A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY
B. VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS – 1961
1. FUNCTIONS OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION
2. MANNER ON APPOINTING MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION
3. WHEN THE HEAD OF MISSION CONSIDERED AS TAKEN UP HIS FUNCTION
4. DIVISION OF THE HEAD OF MISSION
5. PROCEDURE FOR THE RECEPTION OF THE HEADS OF MISSION
6. PRIVILEGES TO THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION
7. THE END OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION

C. VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS – 1963
1. ESTABLISHEMENT OF A CONSULAR POST
2. CONSULAR FUNCTIONS
3. CLASSES OF HEADS OF CONSULAR POSTS
4. APPOINTMENT AND ADMISSION OF HEADS OF CONSULAR POSTS
5. RECEDENCE AS BETWEEN HEADS OF CONSULAR POSTS
6. PERSONS DECLARED “NON GRATA”
7. TERMINATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF A MEMBER OF A CONSULAR POST
8. INVIOLABILITY OF THE CONSULAR PREMISES
9. EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION OF CONSULAR PREMISES
10. INVIOLABILITY OF THE CONSULAR ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS
11. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
12. FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION
13. COMMUNICATION AND CONTACT WITH NATIONALS OF THE SENDING STATE
14. PROTECTION OF CONSULAR OFFICERS
15. PERSONAL INVIOLABILITY OF CONSULAR OFFICERS
16. NOTIFICATION OF ARREST, DETENTION OR PROSECUTION
17. IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION
18. LIABILITY TO GIVE EVIDENCE
19. WAIVER OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY

The ability to practice diplomacy is one of the defining elements of a state, and diplomacy has been practiced since the formation of the first city-states. Originally diplomats were sent only for specific negotiations, and would return immediately after their mission concluded. Diplomats were usually relatives of the ruling family or of very high rank in order to give them legitimacy when they sought to negotiate with the other state.
Modern diplomacy's origins are often traced to the states of Northern Italy in the early Renaissance, with the first embassies being established in the thirteenth century.
The practice spread from Italy to the other European powers. Milan was the first to send a representative to the court of France in 1455. Milan however refused to host French representatives fearing espionage and possible intervention in internal affairs. As foreign powers such as France and Spain became increasingly involved in Italian politics the need to accept emissaries was recognized. Soon all the major European powers were exchanging representatives. Spain was the first to send a permanent representative when it appointed an ambassador to the Court of England in 1487. By the late 16th century, permanent missions became the standard.
Many of the conventions of modern diplomacy developed during this period. The top rank of representatives was an ambassador. An ambassador at this time was almost always a nobleman - the rank of the noble varied with the prestige of the country he was posted to.
Ambassadors at that time were nobles with little foreign or diplomatic experience and needed to be supported by a large embassy staff. These professionals were sent on longer assignments and were far more knowledgeable about the host country. Embassy staff consisted of a wide range of employees, including some dedicated to espionage.
At the same time, permanent foreign ministries were established in almost all European states to coordinate embassies and their staffs. These ministries were still far from their modern form.
The elements of modern diplomacy slowly spread to Eastern Europe and arrived in Russia by the early eighteenth century
After the fall of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna of 1815 established an international system of diplomatic rank. Disputes on precedence among nations (and the appropriate diplomatic ranks used) persisted for over a century until after World War II, when the rank of ambassador became the norm.

SOURCE: http://www.ediplomat.com/nd/history.htm



B. VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS – 1961

SOURCE: http://www.ediplomat.com/nd/treaties/diplomatic_relations.htm

1. FUNCTIONS OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION

The functions of a diplomatic mission consist inter alia in:
a. representing the sending State in the receiving State;
b. protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law;
c. negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;
d. ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State;
e. promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations. (ART 3)

2. MANNER ON APPOINTING MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION

Art. 7. Subject to the provisions of Articles 5, 8, 9 and 11, the sending State may freely appoint the members of the staff of the mission. In the case of military, naval or air attaches, the receiving State may require their names to be submitted beforehand, for its approval.
Art. 8. Members of the diplomatic staff of the mission should in principle be of the nationality of the sending State.
Members of the diplomatic staff of the mission may not be appointed from among persons having the nationality of the receiving State, except with the consent of that State which may be withdrawn at any time.
The receiving State may reserve the same right with regard to nationals of a third State who are not also nationals of the sending State.
The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona non grata or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable. In any such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the mission. A person may be declared non grata or not acceptable before arriving in the territory of the receiving State.
If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable period to carry out its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, the receiving State may refuse to recognize the person concerned as a member of the mission. (Art 9.)

WHEN THE HEAD OF MISSION CONSIDERED AS TAKEN UP HIS FUNCTION

The head of the mission is considered as having taken up his functions in the receiving State either when he has presented his credentials or when he has notified his arrival and a true copy of his credentials has been presented to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State, or such other ministry as may be agreed, in accordance with the practice prevailing in the receiving State which shall be applied in a uniform manner.
1. The order of presentation of credentials or of a true copy thereof will be determined by the date and time of the arrival of the head of the mission. (ART 13)

3. DIVISION OF THE HEAD OF MISSION

Heads of mission are divided into three classes, namely:
that of ambassadors or nuncios accredited to Heads of State, and other heads of mission of equivalent rank;
that of envoys, ministers and internuncios accredited to Heads of State;
that of charges d'affaires accredited to Ministers for Foreign Affairs.
Except as concerns precedence and etiquette, there shall be no differentiation between heads of mission by reason of their class. (ART 14)

4. PROCEDURE FOR THE RECEPTION OF THE HEADS OF MISSION

The procedure to be observed in each State for the reception of heads of mission shall be uniform in respect of each class. (ART 18)
1. If the post of head of the mission is vacant, or if the head of the mission is unable to perform his functions, a charge d'affaires ad interim shall act provisionally as head of the mission. The name of the charge d'affaires ad interim shall be notified, either by the head of the mission or, in case he is unable to do so, by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the sending State to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State or such other ministry as may be agreed.
2. In cases where no member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is present in the receiving State, a member of the administrative and technical staff may, with the consent of the receiving State, be designated by the sending State to be in charge of the current administrative affairs of the mission. (ART 19)

6. PRIVILEGES TO THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION

AS TO PREMISES

The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.
The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution. (ART 22)

AS TO TAX DUTIES

The sending State and the head of the mission shall be exempt from all national, regional or municipal dues and taxes in respect of the premises of the mission, whether owned or leased, other than such as represent payment for specific services rendered.
The exemption from taxation referred to in this Article shall not apply to such dues and taxes payable under the law of the receiving State by persons contracting with the sending State or the head of the mission. (ART 23)
The fees and charges levied by the mission in the course of its official duties shall be exempt from all dues and taxes. (ART 28), (ART 34), (ART 36)

C. AS TO ARCHIVES, DOCUMENTS AND COMMUNICATION

The archives and documents of the mission shall be inviolable at any time and wherever they may be. (ART 24)
The receiving State shall accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the mission. (ART 25) The receiving State shall permit and protect free communication on the part of the mission for all official purposes. (ART 27)

D. AS TO MOVEMENT WITHIN THE TERRITORY

Subject to its laws and regulations concerning zones entry into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of national security, the receiving State shall ensure to all members of the mission freedom of movement and travel in its territory. (ART 26)

E. AS TO ARREST AND DETENTION

The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity. (ART 29)
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
A. a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
B. an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;
C. an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.
3. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic agent except in the cases coming under sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of this Article, and provided that the measures concerned can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person or of his residence.
4. The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State. (ART 31)

7. THE END OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION

The function of a diplomatic agent comes to an end, inter alia:
A. on notification by the sending State to the receiving State that the function of the diplomatic agent has come to an end;
B. on notification by the receiving State to the sending State that, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 9, it refuses to recognize the diplomatic agent as a member of the mission. ART (43)




C. VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS – 1963

SOURCE: http://www.sos.state.tx.us/border/intlprotocol/vienna.shtml


1. ESTABLISHEMENT OF A CONSULAR POST

A consular post may be established in the territory of the receiving State only with that State's consent.
The seat of the consular post, its classification and the consular district shall be established by the sending State and shall be subject to the approval of the receiving State. (ART 4)

2. CONSULAR FUNCTIONS

Consular functions consist in:
protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, within the limits permitted by international law;
furthering the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations between the sending State and the receiving State and otherwise promoting friendly relations between them in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention;
ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the commercial, economic, cultural and scientific life of the receiving State, reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State and giving information to persons interested;
issuing passports and travel documents to nationals of the sending State, and visas or appropriate documents to persons wishing to travel to the sending State;
helping and assisting nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, of the sending State;
acting as notary and civil registrar and in capacities of a similar kind, and performing certain functions of an administrative nature, provided that there is nothing contrary thereto in the laws and regulations of the receiving State;
safeguarding the interests of nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, of the sending State in cases of succession mortis causa in the territory of the receiving State, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving State;
safeguarding, within the limits imposed by the laws and regulations of the receiving State, the interests of minors and other persons lacking full capacity who are nationals of the sending State, particularly where any guardianship or trusteeship is required with respect to such persons;
subject to the practices and procedures obtaining in the receiving State, representing or arranging appropriate representation for nationals of the sending State before the tribunals and other authorities of the receiving State, for the purpose of obtaining, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, provisional measures for the preservation of the rights and interests of these nationals, where, because of absence or any other reason, such nationals are unable at the proper time to assume the defence of their rights and interests;
transmitting judicial and extrajudicial documents or executing letters rogatory or commissions to take evidence for the courts of the sending State in accordance with international agreements in force or, in the absence of such international agreements, in any other manner compatible with the laws and regulations of the receiving State;
exercising rights of supervision and inspection provided for in the laws and regulations of the sending State in respect of vessels having the nationality of the sending State, and of aircraft registered in that State, and in respect of their crews;
extending assistance to vessels and aircraft mentioned in sub-paragraph of this Article and to their crews, taking statements regarding the voyage of a vessel, examining and stamping the ship's papers, and,without prejudice to the powers of the authorities of the receiving State, conducting investigations into any incidents which occurred during the voyage, and settling disputes of any kind between the master, the officers and the seamen in so far as this may be authorized by the laws and regulations of the sending State;
performing any other functions entrusted to a consular post by the sending State which are not prohibited by the laws and regulations of the receiving State or to which no objection is taken by the receiving State or which are referred to in the international agreements in force between the sending State and the receiving State. (ART 5)

3. CLASSES OF HEADS OF CONSULAR POSTS

Heads of consular posts are divided into four classes, namely:
consuls-general;
consuls;
vice-consuls;
(consular agents. (ART 9)
Paragraph 1 of this Article in no way restricts the right of any of the Contracting Parties to fix the designation of consular officers other than the heads of consular posts.
4. APPOINTMENT AND ADMISSION OF HEADS OF CONSULAR POSTS

Heads of consular posts are appointed by the sending State and are admitted to the exercise of their functions by the receiving State.
Subject to the provisions of the present Convention, the formalities for the appointment and for the admission of the head of a consular post are determined by the laws, regulations and usages of the sending State and of the receiving State respectively. (ART 10)

5. RECEDENCE AS BETWEEN HEADS OF CONSULAR POSTS

Heads of consular posts shall rank in each class according to the date of the grant of the exequatur.
If, however, the head of a consular post before obtaining the exequatur is admitted to the exercise of his functions provisionally, his precedence shall be determined according to the date of the provisional admission; this precedence shall be maintained after the granting of the exequatur.
The order of precedence as between two or more heads of consular posts who obtained the exequatur or provisional admission on the same date shall be determined according to the dates on which their commissions or similar instruments or the notifications referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 11 were presented to the receiving State.
Acting heads of posts shall rank after all heads of consular posts and, as between themselves, they shall rank according to the dates on which they assumed their functions as acting heads of posts as indicated in the notifications given under paragraph 2 of Article 15.
Honorary consular officers who are heads of consular posts shall rank in each class after career heads of consular posts, in the order and according to the rules laid down in the foregoing paragraphs.
Heads of consular posts shall have precedence over consular officers not having that status. (ART 16)

6. PERSONS DECLARED “NON GRATA”

The receiving State may at any time notify the sending State that a consular officer is persona non grata or that any other member of the consular staff is not acceptable. In that event, the sending State shall, as the case may be, either recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the consular post.
If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable time to carry out its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, the receiving State may, as the case may be, either withdraw the exequatur from the person concerned or cease to consider him as a member of the consular staff.
A person appointed as a member of a consular post may be declared unacceptable before arriving in the territory of the receiving State or, if already in the receiving State, before entering on his duties with the consular post. In any such case, the sending State shall withdraw his appointment.
In the cases mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, the receiving State is not obliged to give to the sending State reasons for its decision. (ART 23)

7. TERMINATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF A MEMBER OF A CONSULAR POST

The functions of a member of a consular post shall come to an end inter alia:
on notification by the sending State to the receiving State that his functions have come to an end;
on withdrawal of the exequatur;
on notification by the receiving State to the sending State that the receiving State has ceased to consider him as a member of the consular staff. (ART 25)

8. INVIOLABILITY OF THE CONSULAR PREMISES

Consular premises shall be inviolable to the extent provided in this Article.
The authorities of the receiving State shall not enter that part of the consular premises which is used exclusively for the purpose of the work of the consular post except with the consent of the head of the consular post or of his designee or of the head of the diplomatic mission of the sending State. (art 31)

9. EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION OF CONSULAR PREMISES

Consular premises and the residence of the career head of consular post of which the sending State or any person acting on its behalf is the owner or lessee shall be exempt from all national, regional or municipal dues and taxes whatsoever, other than such as represent payment for specific services rendered.
The exemption from taxation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to such dues and taxes if, under the law of the receiving State, they are payable by the person who contracted with the sending State or with the person acting on its behalf. (ART 32)

10. INVIOLABILITY OF THE CONSULAR ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS

The consular archives and documents shall be inviolable at all times and wherever they may be. (ART 33)

11. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Subject to its laws and regulations concerning zones entry into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of national security, the receiving State shall ensure freedom of movement and travel in its territory to all members of the consular post.(ART 34)

12. FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION

The receiving State shall permit and protect freedom of communication on the part of the consular post for all official purposes. In communicating with the Government, the diplomatic missions and other consular posts, wherever situated, of the sending State, the consular post may employ all appropriate means, including diplomatic or consular couriers, diplomatic or consular bags and messages in code or cipher. (ART 35)

13. COMMUNICATION AND CONTACT WITH NATIONALS OF THE SENDING STATE

With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State:
consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State; (ART 36)

14. PROTECTION OF CONSULAR OFFICERS

The receiving State shall treat consular officers with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom or dignity. (ART 40)

15. PERSONAL INVIOLABILITY OF CONSULAR OFFICERS

Consular officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial, except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial authority. (ART 41)

16. NOTIFICATION OF ARREST, DETENTION OR PROSECUTION

In the event of the arrest or detention, pending trial, of a member of the consular staff, or of criminal proceedings being instituted against him, the receiving State shall promptly notify the head of the consular post. Should the latter be himself the object of any such measure, the receiving State shall notify the sending State through the diplomatic channel. (ART 42)

17. IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION

Consular officers and consular employees shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving State in respect of acts performed in the exercise of consular functions.
The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not, however, apply in respect of a civil action either:
arising out of a contract concluded by a consular officer or a consular employee in which he did not contract expressly or impliedly as an agent of the sending State; or
by a third party for damage arising from an accident in the receiving State caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft. (ART 43)

18. LIABILITY TO GIVE EVIDENCE

Members of a consular post may be called upon to attend as witnesses in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings. A consular employee or a member of the service staff shall not, except in the cases mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Article, decline to give evidence. If a consular officer should decline to do so, no coercive measure or penalty may be applied to him.
The authority requiring the evidence of a consular officer shall avoid interference with the performance of his functions. It may, when possible, take such evidence at his residence or at the consular post or accept a statement from him in writing.
Members of a consular post are under no obligation to give evidence concerning matters connected with the exercise of their functions or to produce official correspondence and documents relating thereto. They are also entitled to decline to give evidence as expert witnesses with regard to the law of the sending State. (ART 44)

19. WAIVER OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

The sending State may waive, with regard to a member of the consular post, any of the privileges and immunities provided for in Articles 41, 43 and 44.
The waiver shall in all cases be express, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article, and shall be communicated to the receiving State in writing.
The initiation of proceedings by a consular officer or a consular employee in a matter where he might enjoy immunity from jurisdiction under Article 43 shall preclude him from invoking immunity from jurisdiction in respect of any counter-claim directly connected with the principal claim.
The waiver of immunity from jurisdiction for the purposes of civil or administrative proceedings shall not be deemed to imply the waiver of immunity from the measures of execution resulting from the judicial decisio n; in respect of such measures, a separate waiver shall be necessary. (ART 45)

marriage of a married man in a foreign land

THE PROBLEM

A man (Filipino citizen) married to a Filipina in the Philippines under the Philippine law went to the United States and married a citizen of the United States under the law of the state he resides. What crime he committed?


1. CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE

Under the law of the Philippines, the man committed no crime (Art. 2 Revised Penal Code).

Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the provision of said code shall be enforced within the Philippine Archipelago. The same Article, however, enumerates the exceptions to this rule so that it provides instances when this code is enforceable even outside the territory of the archipelago.

The crime of the married man, if any, in the example is not included in the enumeration of the crimes committed outside the Philippine territory as enumerated in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code (EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS), therefore, the code cannot be invoked to prosecute the married man who marry in the foreign land.

2. JURISDICTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

The general principles of jurisdiction provides that a state is entirely free to project its jurisdiction over any matter taking place outside its territory, so long as this is not prohibited by a contrary rule of international law in a specific case. This power is strengthened further of the principle of the prescriptive jurisdiction of a state to bring any matter within the cognizance of its national law to any person, property, territory or event, wherever they may be situated or wherever they may occur.

However, the same principle asserts that jurisdiction to enforce can generally take place only within its own territory. So that, following the premise cited, a state cannot enforce its prescriptive jurisdiction in the territory of another state.

Applying the national law of the Philippines specifically the Revised Penal Code in consonance to the generally accepted pniciple of international law to indict the person in the example, the national law may have the power to bring the matter within its cognizance, however, it is devoid of any power to enforce such law outside the Philippine territory.

Georgia and Russia Conflict

Russia-Georgia Conflict Has Deep Roots

by Corey Flintoff

The conflict between Russia and Georgia goes well beyond the separatist enclave of South Ossetia. It's also a reassertion of Russian power along its borders. Here's some background on the immediate issues that triggered the latest round of fighting.

What are the separatist issues bedeviling Georgia?

There are two ethnic groups that claim portions of what is now the Republic of Georgia, the Ossetians and the Abkhazians. Like the Georgians, both groups hail from the Caucasus Mountains at the eastern end of the Black Sea. When the Soviets annexed Georgia after the Russian Revolution, they created autonomous regions in Georgia for each of these groups, and those are the regions that are in dispute today.

As the Soviet Union began to break up in the late 1980s, separatists in both regions resisted becoming part of Georgia, preferring to throw their lot in with Russia.

The two ethnic regions — South Ossetia in eastern Georgia, and Abkhazia, on its western Black Sea coast — have been essentially independent since the last round of fighting in 2004. They've had Russian financial support and military backing in the form of Russian troops who were part of a regional peacekeeping mission. Russia has issued passports to most Abkhazians and Ossetians, so it can say that it is intervening on behalf of its own citizens.

Why is Russia supporting the separatists?

Russian nationalists have chafed at the loss of their Soviet-era buffer zone of republics and former Eastern bloc allies. Georgia has been a particular irritant, especially after the Rose Revolution brought pro-Western President Mikhail Saakashvili to power in 2004. Moscow has strongly opposed Georgia's efforts to become part of NATO, seeing the alliance as a potentially unfriendly military presence on Russia's border. Georgia could become the eastern anchor of a chain of NATO allies that stretches from Poland to Turkey.

Georgia is already a military ally of the United States in Iraq, where Georgia deployed about 2,000 troops. The U.S. airlifted those troops back to Georgia because of the crisis there.

Saakashvili took note of the fact that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin personally oversaw the Russian military operation from a command post in Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia. Saakashvili said the Russian leader's purpose is "to depose the democratically elected government of Georgia."

Why are the two regions so important to Georgia?

Although it's comparatively small — only about 50 miles across — South Ossetia represents a deep bite into Georgian territory. It extends south toward two of Georgia's most important assets, pipelines that carry oil and gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to Turkey. Russia opposed the building of those pipelines, which cut Russia out of some of the action in the oil-rich former republics.

Georgia has claimed for years that South Ossetia has become a haven for organized crime, especially the smuggling of tax-free goods from Russia. Georgia has plenty of its own problems with corruption and has been unable to control smuggling elsewhere along the border.

What about Abkhazia?

Abkhazia is important because it includes more than half of Georgia's shoreline on the Black Sea, including ports and some prime tourist areas. Its western edge touches Russia's Black Sea coast, near Sochi, the resort town where Putin has his summer residence.

Abkhazia had a sizable population of ethnic Georgians who were forcibly expelled from the region during the fighting in the early 1990s. Human Rights Watch reported that the Abkhaz separatists committed widespread atrocities against Georgians, including massacres, rapes, torture and ethnic cleansing. The findings were corroborated in a 1994 country report from the U.S. State Department.

There are still pockets of ethnic Georgians living in South Ossetia, and Georgia asserts that it must protect them from the same fate.

What triggered the current fighting?

It began as a series of sniper-fire incidents and clashes between the South Ossetian militia and Georgian army troops during the first week in August. By Aug. 7, Georgian President Saakashvili was charging that the South Ossetians were using heavy weapons that had been brought into the area in violation of the cease-fire. Civilians began to flee Tskhinvali, the town that serves as South Ossetia's capital. On Aug. 8, Saakashvili ordered Georgian troops to capture the city.

Russia responded with airstrikes on Georgian positions, not just in South Ossetia but also in Abkhazia, where Georgian troops still had a foothold in the Kodori Gorge region. Russia has said it is only seeking to restore stability to the two regions, but as its troops advanced out of the separatist regions into undisputed Georgian territory, President Bush accused Russia of seeking to crush the Georgian military and trigger the overthrow of Saakashvili's government.

What can the United States do?

President Bush has called on Russia to stop what he said was a "dramatic and brutal escalation" of violence, and he urged Russia to agree to a cease-fire offer by Georgia. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice joined in a conference call with foreign ministers from Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan — the G-7 group of leading industrial nations. The group, which often includes Russia as an eighth member, called on Russia to respect Georgia's borders and accept the cease-fire.
The U.S. is also backing mediation efforts by the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.



Russia's Policy Towards Ethnic Conflict in Independent Georgia

By James Graham

Russia's policy towards ethnic conflict in Georgia has reflected the fluid and conflicting nature of Russian domestic politics. During the early 1990s Russia's Defence Ministry helped create an unstable and weak Georgia while Russia's Foreign Ministry pushed the need for a strong independent and friendly Georgia as a bulwark against Islamist expansion. Under Putin Russia has linked Georgia to its Chechnya conflict and the war on terrorism. The result has been a weak and fragmented Georgia that has survived in dismembered state. This has satisfied most of Russia's desires but broken and humiliated, Georgia presents a long-term problem for Russia largely of its own making.

Georgia's strategic position has ensured it is of vital military and economic significance to Russia. Its border with NATO member Turkey has always made Georgia strategically important and warranting the locating of numerous Soviet military bases within its territory. Georgia's opposite border is with the unstable North Caucasus region of Russia including the breakaway province of Chechnya. Georgian territory also contains vital Black Sea ports and sits astride potential routes for Russian controlled oil and gas pipelines. Additionally communications and pipelines linking Russia and pro-Russian Armenia run exclusively through Georgia. Russia's policy towards ethnic conflict in Georgia had to take account of numerous geo-strategic factors.

Complete text of this article can be seen in the site:

http://www.historyorb.com/russia/georgia.shtml




Russia-Georgia conflict
by Staff

Georgia and Russia Nearing All-Out War

Michael Schwirtz, Anne Barnard, C. J. Chivers and Anne Barnard., New York TimesThe conflict between Russia and the former Soviet republic of Georgia moved toward all-out war on Saturday as Russia prepared to land ground troops on Georgia’s coast and broadened its bombing campaign both within Georgia and in the disputed territory of Abkhazia.

The fighting that began when Georgian forces tried to retake the capital of South Ossetia, a pro-Russian region that won de facto autonomy from Georgia in the early 1990s, appeared to be developing into the worst clashes between Russia and a foreign military since the 1980s war in Afghanistan.

Georgia’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili, declared that Georgia was in a state of war, ordering government offices to work around the clock, and said that Russia was planning a full-scale invasion of his country.(9 August 2008)

Georgia: oil, neocons, cold war and our credibilityJerome a Paris, Daily Kos

This is another diary critical of the West's position on Georgia.
... First, let's be clear: there are two reasons only we care about Georgia: the oil pipelines that go through its territory, and the opportunity it provides to run aggressive policies towards Russia.
... OK, first, the oil angle.
Georgia does not have oil, but it is a transit country. This is valuable because it provides the only outlet for Caspian oil and natural gas which is not going either through Russia or through Iran. (See the maps and the wider context in that diary) And after a 15-year tug-of-war, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was inaugurated two years ago: it takes roughly 1 million barrels per day from the Azeri oil fields run by BP to the Mediterranean coast of Turkey, via Georgia. That's over 1% of world production, and it is fully controlled by Western oil majors. There is also a smaller gas pipeline that follows the same route and brings smaller volumes of gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey.

These pipelines have been at the heart of the relationship between Georgia and the USA over the past 15 years, but, oddly enough, they have played a very small role in the current crisis. In fact, the BTC pipeline has been cut off for the past few days, not because of events in Georgia (which are in the north of the country, whereas the pipelines go through the south), but because of a bomb attack in Turkey before the conflict started, with claims by the PKK, the Kurdish movement.

The reason the current conflict is not about the oil is because, now that the pipeline is built, that game is, in effect, over. Now, the only thing that could stop the flow of oil is, other than localised attacks (like the one conducted by the Kurds, something that has long been expected, and which was mitigated by building the pipeline on a route that avoids kurdish territory) would be for Russia to actually invade all of Georgia and physically take control of the pipeline, ie an outright act of war not just against Georgia, but also against the US.

The reason for that is that, as part of the process to put in place the pipeline, Georgia invited the US military to set up a base on its territory, near the route of the pipeline. Thus, any attack on the pipeline by Russia would become an attack on the USA.

But the important thing to note is that this base was not set up by the current Georgian government, but by its predecessor, that of Shevarnadze, Georgia's previous president (and, if you remember, Gorbatchev's - and the Soviet Union's - minister for foreign relations in the 80s), which was kicked out of power by Saakashvili's bunch in the rose revolution a couple of years ago - more on this below. That base was seen as a defensive gambit, and was relatively small. Indeed, with Georgia still hosting Russian military bases (see the map I posted here), anything bigger would be ... interesting. Which is what's happening today.

But before we go into the internal politics of Georgia, the thing to note at this point is that it is oil that brought the West to care about Georgia, but that this was a settled situation, and no longer a source of conflict in itself.(9 August 2008)In contrast to Jerome's analysis, the New York Times backgrounder hardly mentions oil at all:

Taunting the Bear .
Analysis: energy pipeline that supplies West threatened by war Georgia conflict

Robin
Pagnamenta, The Times

The conflict that has erupted in the Caucasus has set alarm bells ringing because of Georgia's pivotal role in the global energy market.

Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves of its own but it is a key transit point for oil from the Caspian and central Asia destined for Europe and the US.

Crucially, it is the only practical route from this increasingly important producer region that avoids both Russia and Iran.

The 1,770km (1,100 miles) Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which entered service only last year, pumps up to 1 million barrels of oil per day from Baku in Azerbaijan to Yumurtalik, Turkey, where it is loaded on to supertankers for delivery to Europe and the US. Around 249km of the route passes through Georgia, with parts running only 55km from South Ossetia.

The security of the BTC pipeline, depicted in the James Bond film The World is Not Enough, has been a primary concern since before its construction.
The first major attack on the pipeline took place only last week - not in Georgia but in Turkey where part of it was destroyed by PKK separatist rebels.(8 August 2008)

Georgia Clash Provides a Lesson on the United States’ Need for Russia
Helene Cooper, New York Times

The image of President Bush smiling and chatting with Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin of Russia from the stands of the Beijing Olympics even as Russian aircraft were shelling Georgia outlines the reality of America’s Russia policy. While America considers Georgia its strongest ally in the bloc of former Soviet countries, Washington needs Russia too much on big issues like Iran to risk it all to defend Georgia.

And State Department officials made it clear on Saturday that there was no chance the United States would intervene militarily.

... For the Bush administration, the choice now becomes whether backing Georgia - which, more than any other former Soviet republic has allied with the United States - on the South Ossetia issue is worth alienating Russia at a time when getting Russia’s help to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions is at the top of the United States’ foreign policy agenda.(9 August 2008)

Complete Story of the Articles can be found in the site:
http://energybulletin.net/node/46173

Bangsamoro Treaty

The Bangsamoro ‘treaty’

By Isagani A. CruzPhilippine Daily InquirerFirst Posted 21:29:00 08/09/2008

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front regarding the legal personality and rights of the so-called Bangsamoros has provoked heated debate on its validity in light of the pertinent provisions of the Constitution of 1987. Its formal signing last Tuesday was deferred by a temporary restraining older from the Supreme Court, which will hear oral arguments on the matter on Aug. 15.

This article is humbly offered for a better understanding of the agreement shorn of all its legal gobbledygook and presented in terms more familiar to the majority of our people who have not had the benefit of formal or even informal studies on the principles of our republican government.

A state is defined as a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a fixed territory, and possessed of an independent government organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. Its essential elements are people, territory, government, and sovereignty.

The term people refers to the population of the state, which may be big like the 1.3 billion of China or small like the some 400,000 only of Iceland. They must come from both sexes to perpetuate the race. Theoretically, they must be numerous enough to be self-sufficient and defend themselves but not so many as to be difficult to govern and feed.

The territory is a fixed portion of the surface of the earth consisting of the land mass known as the terrestrial domain, the internal and external waters called the maritime and fluvial domain, and the air space above the land and the waters, or the aerial domain. The components of an archipelago are integrated into one complete unit instead of being fragmented into separate islands.

Government is the instrumentality through which the will of the state is formulated, expressed and realized. It may be democratic or dictatorial, monarchial or republican, and must have jurisdiction over the inhabitants of the state and the capacity to represent it in its relations with other states.

Sovereignty means independence of the state from external control in its relations with its people and other members of the family of nations. The majority view is that it is its recognition as such that makes the state an international person and entitles it to participate in the decisions and activities of the family of nations.

I would not call the lengthy document “just a piece of paper” that does not deserve much attention. Whether it is eventually sustained or rejected by the Supreme Court, it is to me an insult per se to the democratic nature of our government and evidence of the docility of its present leadership.

The Philippines is unquestionably a state, possessing all the essential elements of statehood, with our more than 83 million population, our archipelagic territory, our rather wobbly government that is disgraced as the most corrupt in Asia, and the independence we regained in 1946 from the United States, which actually still controls us.

The MILF is only a rebellious group that our government has not even expressly recognized as a belligerent community under international law. But we are dealing with it as if it were a full-fledged state with the capacity, among other powers, to enter into treaties. Worse, it wants us to accept the Bangsamoro as a separate state with full and expressed preference “in their favor” in case of conflict with the Philippine Republic.

I do not intend to discuss the agreement in detail, assuming I have the competence to do so, which I have not at this time. The Supreme Court will eventually do this, as usual in a kilometric ponencia, with accompanying concurring and dissenting opinions. I will just say for the nonce that it contains many shocking provisions, like the recognition of the Bangsamoros as the exclusive owners of their claimed homeland covering various parts of the national territory described in Article 1 of our Constitution.
There are other incredible concessions given by the Republic of the Philippines to the Bangsamoros, such as the right to exercise powers exclusively vested in what the agreement calls the Central Government. The intention, it would seem, is to compare their ancestral domain to a component in a federation, which we are not. Moreover, the members of a federation, like the states in the United States, cannot exercise powers belonging only to the federal government, like the conduct of foreign affairs.

It is strongly suspected that the controversial agreement President Macapagal-Arroyo is endorsing is part of her scheme to replace our present Republic with a federal government where she will remain in power as its president or prime minister. She expects to do this with the controlled electoral support of the “Bangsamoro People” and the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity with which she is willing to share her authority in the governance of what the agreement grandly calls the “First Nation.”

I hope the solicitor general will not again claim the executive privilege of the President to prevent a full disclosure of the motives of the questioned agreement, which its apologists are already arrogantly calling “a done deal.” To many anxious and anguished citizens like me, it is nothing less than a treaty of surrender that should make the Republic of the Philippines bow its head in sorrow and shame.

For better understanding of the stand of the Muslims regarding this issue visit this site: http://bangsamoro.wordpress.com/


The Bangsamoro Struggle for Self-Determination

by Guiamel M. Alim, Executive Director, Kadtuntaya Foundation, Inc.

The Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination is already a struggle of generations. The longest in Asia and maybe the whole world, it started in the 16th century and up to now there is no clear indiator yet as to when it will end. Other peoples' struggle in the world have either succeeded or been totally crushed. The Moro struggle is still going on. It is an ongoing struggle for survival, cultural identity and for the right to self-determination.

The Bangsa Moro : Who are they?

Bangsa Moro ("the Moro People") is the generic name for the 13 ethnolinguistic Muslim tribes in the Philippines which constitute a quarter of the population in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. They number from 5-6 million and are found in every major island of the country. They share a distinct culture, speak different dialects, are varied in their social formation but share a common belief in Islam. This is a uniting factor among the different groups.

Of the 13 groups, there are three major groups on the bases of population and their leadership. These are the Maguindanaons (the people of the flooded plains), the Maranaos (people living around the lake) and the Tausogs (people of the current). These major groups have rallied the support of the Bangsa Moro in their struggle for self-determination.

The history of the struggle

The Bangsa Moro struggle for self-determination cannot be placed in proper perspective without a brief account of the Islamic era which began in the year 1310 A.D. through the efforts of Arab traders, travellers, sufis (saintly Muslims) and Muslim missionaries. Islam as a way of life (politics, governance, economic systems, justice systems, etc.) spread and soon Islamic principalities in Sulu and Maguindanao were established. In the 15th century and early 16th century, the Sultanate of Sulu and Maguindanao came into being. Each sultanate was independent, had sovereign power and had diplomatic and trade relations with other countries in the region.

Other Muslim principalities known as emirates, like those of Rajah Solaiman in Manila and the emirates of Panay and Mindoro, were also born. This goes to show that Islam stands on record as the first political institution, the first institutional religion, the first educational system and the first civilization in the Philippines, and that its economy was far advanced than those of the other indigenous communities. But before the Bangsa Moro could fully grow into full nationstatehood, a series of foreign colonial interventions came their way.

The Complete Article found in the website:
http://www.philsol.nl/solcon/Guiamel-95.htm


GRP-MILF draft pact on Bangsamoro homeland

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) herein referred to as the “Parties” to this Agreement.

Terms of Reference

The context of referents follows:

The Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities dated July 18, 1997 Between the GRP and the MILF, and its Implementing Administrative and Operational Guidelines;

The General Framework of Agreement of Intent Between the GRP and the MILF dated August 27, 1998;

The Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF dated March 24, 2001;

The Tripoli Agreement on Peace Between the GRP and the MILF dated June 22, 2001;

The Tripoli Agreement Between the GRP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) dated December 23, 1976 and the Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement Between the GRP and the MNLF dated September 2, 1996;

Republic Act No. 6734, as amended by R.A. 9054, otherwise known as “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)”;

ILO Convention No. 169, in correlation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and Republic Act No. 8371 otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, the UN Charter; the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and internationally recognized human rights instruments; and

Compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua’hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device. For the purpose of this Agreement, a “treaty” is defined as any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understanding, obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the Agreement.

Have agreed and acknowledged as follows:

CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as “Bangsamoros”. The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected.

2. It is essential to lay the foundation of the Bangsamoro homeland in order to address the Bangsamoro people’s humanitarian and economic needs as well as their political aspirations. Such territorial jurisdictions and geographic areas being the natural wealth and patrimony represent the social, cultural and political identity and pride of all the Bangsamoro people. Ownership of the homeland is vested exclusively in them by virtue of their prior rights of occupation that had inhered in them as sizeable bodies of people, delimited by their ancestors since time immemorial, and being the first politically organized dominant occupants.

3. Both Parties acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain but encompasses ancestral, communal, and customary lands, maritime, fluvial and alluvial domains as well all natural resources therein that have inured or vested ancestral rights on the basis of native title. Ancestral domain and ancestral land refer to those held under claim of ownership, occupied or possessed, by themselves or through the ancestors of the Bangsamoro people, communally or individually since time immemorial continuously to the present, except when prevented by war, civil disturbance, force majeure, or other forms of possible usurpation or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government project or any other voluntary dealings entered into by the government and private individuals, corporate entities or institutions.

4. Both Parties acknowledge that the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people is rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The Moro sultanates were states or karajaan/kadatuan resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of nation-state in the modern sense. As a domestic community distinct from the rest of the national communities, they have a definite historic homeland. They are the “First Nation” with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations.

The Parties concede that the ultimate objective of entrenching the Bangsamoro homeland as a territorial space is to secure their identity and posterity, to protect their property rights and resources as well as to establish a system of governance suitable and acceptable to them as distinct dominant people.

5. Both Parties affirm their commitment to mutually respect the right to one’s identity and the parity of esteem of everyone in the political community. The protection of civil rights and religious liberties of individuals underlie the basis of peace and justice of their totality of relationships.

6. Both Parties agree that the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) shall have the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral lands, including both alienable and non-alienable lands encompassed within their homeland and ancestral history, as well as the delineation of ancestral domain/lands of the Bangsamoro people located therein.

7. Vested property rights upon the entrenchment of the BJE shall be recognized and respected subject to paragraph 9 of the strand on Resources.

The Complete Text of this Article can be found in the site:
http://blog.wyzemoro.com/grp-milf-draft-pact-on-bangsamoro-homeland/

Question on Pimentel vs Exe. Sec,

This question is regarding the case filed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary. In that case, the Court dismissed the petition of Sen. Pimentel ruling that:

The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the county’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.

In addition, the Court emphasized that under the Constitution, ‘the power to ratify is vested in the President, SUBJECT TO THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE.’(capitalizing letters supplied to emphasize)

MY QUESTION:

Why is it expressly stated in the Constitution and in this ruling the phrase “SUBJECT TO THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE”, when such concurrence is NOT NECESSARY AND NOT BINDING?

Pimentel Jr. vs Office of the Exe. Sec.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. et al. vs. Office of the Executive Secretary represented by Hon. Alberto Romulo, Department of Foreign Affairs represented by Hon. Blas Ople

G. R. No. 158088. July 6, 2005

FACTS:

On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute was opened for signature at its headquarter in New York. On December 28, 2000, three days before its deadline for signing, the Philippines through its Charge d’ Affairs, Enrique A. Manalo signed the Statute. By its provision, however, it is requiring that it be ratified by the accepting states.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, file this petition to compel the Hon. Alberto Romulo (Executive Secretary) and Hon. Blas Ople (Department of Foreign Affairs) – respondents in this case – to transmit the signed document to the Senate for ratification.

Hon. Alberto Romulo and Hon. Blas Ople, on the other hand, argue that they as representative of the Executive Department have no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.

ISSUE:

Who has the power to ratify the Rome Statute?

HELD:

The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the county’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.

The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

Thus, this petition is DISMISSED. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.

LINKS TO ICC

LIST OF LINKS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

1. International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court)

2. Crime against humanity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime_against_humanity )

3. Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court#Jurisdiction)

4. Genocide definitions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocide_definitions)

5. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_the_Prevention_and_Punishment_of_the_Crime_of_Genocide)

6. Victim participation and reparations
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court#Victim_participation_and_reparations)

7. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm)


8. Stages of genocide and efforts to prevent it (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocide#Stages_of_genocide_and_efforts_to_prevent_it)

9. International Criminal Court: Information and Much More from Answer.com
(http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/index.htm)

10. United States and the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_and_the_International_Criminal_Court)

11. Judges of the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judges_of_the_International_Criminal_Court)

12. People detained by the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People_detained_by_the_International_Criminal_Court#Detention_centre)

13.Cases before the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cases_before_the_International_Criminal_Court)

14. Complaints to the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complaints_to_the_International_Criminal_Court)

15. The International Criminal Court and the 2003 invasion of Iraq (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_International_Criminal_Court_and_the_2003_invasion_of_Iraq)

16. International Criminal Court
(http://www.icc-cpi.int/home.html)

17. Coalition for the International Criminal Court (http://www.icc-cpi.int/home.html)

18. States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Parties_of_the_International_Criminal_Court)

19. The International Criminal Court: An End To Impunity? (http://www.crimesofwar.org/icc_magazine/icc-intro.html)

20. The International Criminal Court: Global Policy Forum (http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/index.htm)

RECOGNITION PRINCIPLE

Different Principles in Recognizing States


A. Tobar or Wilson Principle
Examples
1. The Baltic States
2. Croatia and Slovenia Unrecognized

B. Stimpson Doctrine
Historical Basis

C. Estrada Doctrine
Example
Ukraine's Independence


A. Tobar or Wilson Principle

Under this principle, it is suggested that recognition shall not be extended to any government established by revolution, civil war, coup d’etat or other forms of internal violence until the freely elected representatives of the people have organized a constitutional government.

Examples.

1. The Baltic States

Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were recognized as independent states in the early 1920's. The United States, announced its de jure recognition on 28 July 1922 after noting `the successful maintenance within their borders of political and economic stability' by the governments of the three Baltic states.

2. Croatia and Slovenia Unrecognized

On 25 June 1991, both Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. The Constitutional Resolution Regarding the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia adopted by the Croatian Parliament based its actions `upon the will of the nation demonstrated at the referendum of 19 May 1991,' and argued that `the SFRY no longer is acting as the constitutional-legal organized state.' Article I of the Resolution proclaims Croatia as a sovereign and independent state. Interestingly, however, Article II states that Croatia thus `begins the process of disassociation from the other republics of the SFRY' and `begins the process of gaining international recognition.'


B. Stimpson Doctrine

It was “ incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.”

Historical Basis:

The policy of expansionism in China pursued by the autonomous Kwantung Army of Japan accelerated in the late 1920s and early 1930s and became a major concern of the U.S. government. On September 18, 1931, Japanese soldiers guarding the South Manchurian Railway blew up part of the track in order to manufacture an excuse to seize Manchuria proper. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson reacted to what he regarded as a violation of international law as well as treaties that the Japanese Government had signed. Since calls for a cessation of hostilities between China and Japan failed and President Herbert Hoover had rejected economic sanctions in principle, Stimson declared in January 1932 that the U.S. Government would not recognize any territorial or administrative changes the Japanese might impose upon China. The Stimson Doctrine was echoed in March 1932 by the Assembly of the League of Nations, which unanimously adopted an anti-Japanese resolution incorporating virtually verbatim the Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition. However, as the Secretary of State later realized, he had at his disposal only "spears of straws and swords of ice." In short order, Japanese representatives simply walked out of the League, and the Kwangtung Army formalized its conquest of Manchuria by establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo under former Chinese emperor Pu-Yi. When war between Japan and China broke out following a minor clash between military units at the Marco Polo Bridge in 1937, the impotence of the "Stimson Doctrine" became even more apparent.

C. Estrada Doctrine

Under this doctrine, it is declared that it would, as it saw fit, continue or terminate its relations with any country in which a political upheaval had taken place “ and in so doing it does not pronounce judgment, regarding the right of foreign nations to accept, maintain or replace their governments or authorities.

Example:

Ukraine's Independence

Like other Soviet republics, Ukraine had declared its sovereignty on 16 July 1990. Many observers saw this declaration, and that of Byelorussia of 27 July 1990, in terms of jockeying for economic advantage in the process of the devolution of power from the centre. On 24 August 1991, after the collapse of the Moscow coup, Ukraine went one step further by declaring its independence and Byelorussia followed suit the next day. Ukraine's Declaration of Independence was, however, made subject to the results of a referendum to be held on 1 December 1991 and countries accordingly had good reason to hold off consideration of recognition until that time.
To the surprise of most observers who had underestimated the support for independence in Ukraine, participation in the referendum was over 80% and the vote in favour exceeded 90%. The referendum result effectively completed the Declaration of Independence and other countries had no further excuse to hold off consideration of recognition. But there was one strong political factor militating against early recognition. President Gorbachev was working towards a Union Treaty which would preserve a Soviet centre and countries were loathe to undercut the stability that such a move seemed to represent, particularly in terms of continuing Soviet acceptance of its obligations under the various disarmament treaties.Canada, home to a large community tracing its origins to Ukraine, decided not to wait for Gorbachev's Union Treaty. On 2 December 1991, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that Canada had decided to recognize Ukraine as an independent state. The Canadian statement referred to the overwhelming support for independence in the referendum and undertook to enter into negotiations on diplomatic relations noting that `as part of these negotiations, Canada will wish to be satisfied with respect to Ukraine's stated intentions that it will ensure that nuclear weapons remain under secure control until they are disposed of, comply with existing arms control, disarmament and other international agreements, and adhere to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and other CSCE documents, with particular attention to full respect for human rights and protection of minorities.